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Mailing Address: PO Box 2342, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Telephone ++ (92-51) 2278134, 2278136, 2277146, 2270674-76
Fax ++(92-51) 2278135, URL:www.sdpi.org

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Language Teaching and Worldview in Pakistani Schools[1]

Tariq Rahman

Introduction

Everybody has a way of looking at the world, making sense of sensory data and passing value judgments. This is roughly what one may call a 'worldview'. With reference to scientific communities Kuhn calls it a paradigm. One of the meanings he gives to this theoretical construct is as follows:

> *The entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community (Kuhn 1962: 175).*

I believe that this definition, with minor alterations, can also be used for non-scientific communities. I propose to use it in this study for the belief-system of students in Pakistani schools. For this purpose I have looked at three kinds of schools: the ones which use English as the medium of instruction (called English schools); ones which use Urdu for this purpose (Urdu schools) and religious seminaries (*madrassas*). I have not been able to focus on Sindhi and Pashto-medium schools. The former are located in the province of Sindh, mostly in the rural areas, and the latter are in the Pashto-speaking areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Sindhi-medium schools go up to class 10 (matriculation) while the Pashto-medium ones are only primary schools. However, most schools are Urdu-medium ones because the most populated province, Punjab, uses Urdu as medium of instruction in non-elitist state schools. Most schools in the N.W.F.P, including all secondary ones, also use Urdu. All schools in Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas are also Urdu-medium institutions. In the cities of Sindh too Urdu is the most common medium of instruction in schools. In short, this study takes into account most of the non-elitist students of the public sector schools in Pakistan. It also attempts to take into account students of *madrassas* as well as those of elitist, and not-so-elitist, English schools.

The objective of the study is to relate the worldview of the students of these three kinds of educational institutions to language-teaching policies. The basic questions to be answered are: what kind of language texts are used? What worldview is given in these language-texts? What kind of person is likely to be produced by such texts and practices of language-learning?

The assumptions are that language texts influence students; that, keeping other factors constant, they help create this or that kind of worldview. This is an assumption because it cannot be proved that a person has certain beliefs because he or she has been exposed to this or that text. Moreover, students are less exposed to texts than to the peer group, parents, teachers, the media and society in general. In short, the other factors which we assumed to be constants, cannot in fact be kept constant in real life. This being the case I do not make the strong claim that (a) because of reading certain language texts and being taught in a certain manner students have certain beliefs. Instead, I make the weaker claim that (b) language texts may reinforce, or tend to reinforce, beliefs and values which other informal and formal aspects of socialization might have created among students.

1. Research support of The Asia Foundation Basic Education Project, Pakistan, is greatfully acknowledged.

I believe the value of the study lies not so much in what language-teaching does, which is very difficult to determine, as in understanding the ideological contents of language-teaching texts. This is more easily determinable because the texts can be read and their ideological content analysed. This, indeed, is my methodology in this study.

Worldview and Language

The social studies texts – history, civics, Pakistan Studies -- are the major ideology-disseminating texts. However, language texts too serve the same purpose. They do it in two ways: first through a choice of emotive terms and second by presenting ideology-laden items – poems, prose pieces, letters, conversations, exercises – in language-teaching textbooks. The first strategy, that of using value-laden diction, is an integral part of language even if it is not consciously being manipulated to reinforce certain values. Most adjectives concerning human action are valuational. Thus, in most cultures, being `intelligent', `fast', `enterprising', `bold', `confident', `charismatic', beautiful', `rich' and `respected' are terms of positive valuation. But it can be argued that they all come from subjective assumptions. One of these assumptions, however unconscious, is that power and its manifestation, dominance or rank-seeking, are justified. The qualities of having better cognitive abilities than other people; or of possessing greater courage; or of having other distinguishing characteristics finally make a person stand out and become more powerful and potentially more capable of dominating other human beings. Beauty and riches are also distinguishing features which everyone does not possess. Prestige, respect or `recognition' – as Francis Fukuyama calls it (1992: 146) – are consequences of being distinguished; of being better than others. But, whereas all these qualities are in the interest of those who can be distinguished, they are against the interest of those who are condemned never to be distinguished. All those who are `stupid', `slow', `cowardly', `diffident', `dull', `ugly' and `poor' should logically regard all the qualities mentioned about as negative attributes — as weapons with which a minority is endowed and which, very unfairly, gives it power over others. The overall framework of power, however, is so universally accepted that everyone, including those excluded from its realm, accept it as being positive. Thus, our agreement to use words at all mean that we accept a certain view of reality, a certain construction of normalcy, which is power-laden in the sense that it is not in everybody's interest.

But, apart from such ideological subtleties of language use, Pakistani textbooks and official media use deliberately ideology-laden and emotive words. Among these, those in the first cluster revolve around the concept of martyrdom (*shahadat*) in a holy war (*jihad*). Since the first war in 1948 with India, the state has been using the vocabulary of *jihad* for all its wars. Mawlana Mawdudi, the leader of Jama'at Islami, declared that sending `vigilante groups organized by the government to conduct a covert war in Kashmir could not be fighting a jihad, nor could the government surreptitiously support a jihad while professing to observe a cease-fire' (Nasr 1996: 42). However, the government used *jihad* vocabulary to rouse deeply felt religious emotions against India. This became so much a feature of official vocabulary that even Christian army officers who died in wars were called *shaheeds* (martyrs). Later all army officers, even when they died in accidents, were called *shaheeds*. Great national leaders, not to be left behind, whether killed by the state (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) or by unknown causes (Zia ul Haq) were also declared as being martyred (*shaheed*).

Another cluster of words concerns politics. Secularism has been translated as *la diniyat* (literally speaking `not having a religion' or `lack of faith'). This makes the reader of Urdu texts feel that those who support secular politics are atheists or, at least, not good Muslims. The term democracy has been used by everyone but it has meant different things. Ayub Khan's `basic democracy' was control over electoral colleges while Zia ul Haq's Islamic democracy was a camouflage for his own rule. Similarly, all welfare

programmes — the socialism of Bhutto and the welfare state of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif — have been named Islamic to appease the clergy which would otherwise condemn them as being leftist philosophies.

Other clusters of words refer to social and cultural aspects. The male dominating values of our culture are reflected in the way womens' sexuality is stigmatized while mens' is controlled at the expressed, public level but actually flaunted at a sub-level of male interaction. Thus, while women cannot confess to having male friends, let alone lovers, in all but highly Westernized social circles, men boast about their conquests to their friends. While it is a disgrace for a family if a woman has sex outside marriage, it is much less of a disgrace for a man. Words pertaining to honour — *izzat, asmat, ghairat, sharm, haia* — all refer much more saliently, much more seriously, to female waywardness than to male. Indeed, in most areas of Pakistan men's honour lies so much in the control of female sexuality that they kill their women for it. From this notion of sexuality comes the strong imperative of hiding away the female, seen primarily as a sexual object, from other males. Hence words like `the family', `*androon-e-khana', `ghar wale*' (both meaning those who live inside the house), *bacche* (children) are used for the wife in middle class and working class families. In Pakistani languages female cousins are called sisters and even in Pakistan English the term cousin sister is used for them (Rahman 1990: 72).

Literary and language-teaching texts use these clusters in varying degrees. Thus, in the vocabulary itself they reinforce a worldview contingent upon male-dominating, sexuality-denying and aggression-validating values in the social sphere; religious and nationalistic values in the political sphere and a definite bias towards the sacralization of war and the military in the sphere of foreign policy. These values are also reinforced in English medium schools but, since pupils of Urdu medium schools are less exposed to liberal-humanist values in English fiction, foreign T.V programmes and at home, they are more exposed to them than their English-medium counterparts.

Apart from the linguistic biases inherent in the vocabulary of language texts, there is their content. Language texts are, so to speak, the B team of the state while the A team is the whole complex of Pakistan studies, social studies and history. One of the avowed aims, indeed the major one, of all language courses is to promote the `ideology of Pakistan' expressed in different ways. Urdu is said to be the national language, to which the Quaid-i-Azam gave his approval, and must be taught to defend the ideology of Pakistan (*Nisab-e-Urdu* 1986: 9 & 14). Persian too is to be taught for ideological reasons (Farsi 1987: 1). Arabic, above all, is to be the vehicle of Islam.

Methodology

Just how frequently language-teaching text books expose students to ideological messages is not easy to determine. A rough estimate can be obtained by counting the number of ideological items — poems, prose pieces, exercises — in every language-teaching textbook used in the Urdu-medium schools. This assumes that the more children come in contact with ideological lessons in the classroom, or in the course of their studies, the more are they likely to be influenced by the ideologies they propagate. As mentioned earlier, there are, of course, other influences on children and much depends on the teacher, the atmosphere at home, the locality and the peer group to say nothing of the child's own temperament. However, other factors being equal, the assumption upon which the following study is based is that the greater the exposure to ideological items the greater the chances of a students' acceptance of them. For this purpose the percentage of ideological lessons in textbooks has been determined. Such as exercise has never been undertaken by researchers as far as language-teaching school texts are concerned. However, Sibt-e-Hasan, a Pakistani researcher, carried out an analysis of Urdu textbooks from class 1 till 5. He divided lessons

into those on nationalism and religious or moral indoctrination. He then subtracted the number of these ideological lessons from the total number of lessons in the books (Hasan n.d). Unfortunately he neither took out percentages nor did he compare the percentage of ideological lessons in Urdu textbooks with textbooks in other languages or subjects (such as Pakistan Studies or history).

In this study too the number of ideological lessons out of the total number of lessons in language-teaching textbooks has been determined in order to understand how propagandist school textbooks are. For the purpose of this exercise, ideological texts were defined as texts pertaining directly or indirectly to Islam, nationalism and the military. In the first category are texts pertaining to Islam, Muslim civilization and cultural achievements and eminent personalities from the history of Islam. In the second category are texts pertaining to Pakistani nationalism, Pakistani identity, the movement to create Pakistan, eminent leaders of Pakistan and so on. In the third category are texts pertaining to the glorification of war, the armed forces of Pakistan or military heroes. In many cases these themes overlap but the text is classified under the dominant theme. The percentage of the ideological lessons is calculated on the basis of the total number of lessons in the textbook. These percentages are given in the tables given later in this study.

This study has four chapters. The first is on the language-teaching policies of the several governments of Pakistan. Since schools are supposed to follow these policies it is necessary to know what they are to begin with. Chapter 2 is on the Urdu-medium schools which have no escape from these policies. Then comes a chapter on English-medium schools (Chapter 3) where some deviation from these policies is possible because of the elitist status of these institutions. The last chapter (chapter 4) is on *madrassas* which defy the state's policies so as to preserve their own religious identity. In the end there is a conclusion which brings the insights gained in this study in perspective.

The State's Language-Teaching Policies

The first educational conference held at Karachi (27 November to 1st December 1947) laid the foundations of a language-teaching policy which the state still follows. The cardinal points of this policy were to make Urdu `the lingua franca of Pakistan' and to teach it `as a compulsory language in schools' (PEC 1948:43). While the conference did not make it a medium of instruction in schools, the situation was that it was being used as such in the Punjab, the N.W.F.P, Baluchistan and in parts of Kashmir. In Sind alone, out of the provinces of present-day Pakistan, was Sindhi the medium of instruction for most schools. But even here the cities were changing fast in their demographic composition. The predominantly Urdu-speaking mohajirs were migrating in large numbers from northern India and settling down in the cities (Census 1951:Statements 2.E&F). Having more urban, eduated people among them than the Sindhis (Census 1951: Tables 9-B), they wanted more and more schools -- Urdu and English-medium schools -- in the cities of Sindh. Thus, when Karachi became a federal area separate from Sind on 23 July 1948 the number of schools was as follows:

Medium of instruction	Number of Schools	
	1949-50	1950-51
Urdu-medium	69	80
Sindhi-medium	57	59
Gujrati-medium	17	17

(ABE 1954: 53)

The figure for both Sindhi and Gujrati-medium schools decreased even further in the years to come.

Symbolic Value of Urdu

Urdu was given so important a place for political and psychological reasons. The political ones are easy to catalogue: Pakistan was a multilingual country and the ruling elite used Islam and Urdu, in that order, as symbols of integration. Urdu, then, was to help forge the Pakistani national identity which would reduce the threat of ethnic identities, focussed around their indigenous languages, from weakening or disintegrating the state along ethnic lines. According to ethnic nationalists this policy helped the Punjabi and Mohajir elites to consolidate their power in all the provinces of Pakistan and was, therefore, part of an overall policy of internal colonialism. However, since it was English not Urdu which was used at the elitist level in all central services, the rule of English-knowing people was ensured and Urdu was, of anything, only a threat to it. However, this policy did favour the Mohajirs and Punjabis at the lower levels of power. Moreover it elevated the status of Urdu vis a vis the other languages of Pakistan. This created the valorization of the urban, Urdu-using culture and a corresponding devaluation of indigenous vernacular-using rural cultures. This was the psychological dimension -- the valuation of one symbolic system (language, code of conduct, dress, values and a way of structuring and categorization of reality) rather than the many symbolic systems based on the indigenous languages and ways of life. Psychologically speaking, then, the valuation of Urdu vis-a-vis the indigenous languages created a situation which can only be described in terms of cultural imperialism.

An imperialism which, as Paulo Freire points out, is not only acquiesced into but actively supported by those who are subjected to it -- the `invaded'. Indeed, everyone -- `invader' and `invaded' -- accept, internalize and act according to the same values (Freire 1989: 151).

As anyone who knows Pakistan will observe, this is true for most middle class people in the Punjab. They believe that Urdu, and the values which go with urban Mughal culture (the culture of the Urdu-speaking elite), are superior to Punjabi and rural values. However, in the N.W.F.P, Sindh and tribal Balochistan people are proud of their indigenous culture. The language movements of various parts of Pakistan -- including the Hindko, Siraiki, Punjabi, Balochi and other language movements -- are trying to make urban Urdu-using people take pride in their indigenous language and culture too (Rahman 1996). In short then, the policy of favouring Urdu explicity has devalued the other indigenous languages of Pakistan while English, about which more will be said elsewhere, has devalued all Pakistani languages.

Opinion - Moulding Textbooks

Urdu was not, however, the only, or even the main, part of nation-building. Islam and nationalist symbols -- an ideology, flag, pride in independent national identity -- were used to construct or `imagine', a la Benedict Andersen (1983), a nation. Since identity is maintained by boundary-marking; by making the `other' define what we are not; by creating contrasts and oppositions; by under-playing similarities and over-emphasizing differences -- the state has used socialising, or opinion-moulding, texts to do this in varying degrees. The `other' in the case of Pakistan is, of course, India. The Pakistani identity is defined, in official myth-making, as the `Muslim' identity. This identity is an undifferentiated monolith -- its sectarian, ethnic, linguistic, class, educational and power differentials are ignored or underplayed or presented as if they were merely variations of a whole rather than painful differences. The `other' Hindu identity too is a similar monolith. It too is not allowed to be differentiated so that there is no room for understanding that the response of an Indian liberal towards Muslims (and other issues) may be as different from that of a BJP nationalist than that of a Pakistani liberal from a hard-liner state functionary towards similar issues.

History is always the greatest victim of a regime which intends to brain-wash its population. Well known state interventions in historiography in modern times have been those of Hitler, Mussolini and the Soviet decision-makers. In India the Congress, with a view to creating a composite Indian nationalism by eliminating the tension between Muslim and Hindu identities, promoted history which deemphasized the role of religion and emphasized that of economic and political factors in India's past. The National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) textbooks do not vilify Muslims but they do not accept Islam as a basis for the creation of Pakistan (Behera 1996: 198). The Hindu nationalists, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), wants to control 'history as a justification for a Hindu identity for India' (Thapar 1993). In 1977 Morarji Desai conceded the Hindu nationalist' demands (in this case the Jan Sangh's) by banning well known histories. Among others Romila Thapar's *Medieval India:* Bipin Chandra's, *Modern India* and R.S. Sharma's *Ancient India* were withdrawn from the schools. The Janata government, however, lost its hold on power in 1979 and the Indian History Congress endorsed the textbooks reaffirming its commitment to the 'scientific and secular approach to the study of history' (Behera 1996: 200). However, in the 1990s when the BJP came to power in several Indian states, including UP, the question of Hinduizing history again came to the forefront. According to Behera who describes this debate, the BJP failed to convince the Indian National Congress at its 54th session in December 1993 and the debate goes on.

In Pakistan the opinion-moulding texts used in schools were primarily historical or social studies texts. Language-teaching texts were used to reinforce the ideological contents of these texts. The state carried out a conscious policy of Islamizing all textbooks. Early in the 1950s it was resolved that `history books will be re-written'. Item 11 (para 18), where this was written, said:

> *ways and means be found to encourage publication of standard books dealing with achievements of Islam with special reference to (a) Historical personages, episodes and (b) contributions to art, science and culture (ABE 1954: 26).*

Several committees were made for this purpose and the new Islamized and Pakistanized textbooks were introduced from April 1952 in many schools (ABE 1954: 48)

Islam was emphasized as the cornerstone of the Pakistani identity from the beginning. Hence education, at least in state vernacular-medium schools, included an Islamic component in the humanities texts from the beginning. However, in Zia ul Haq's regime (1977-1988) Islamization of education became more imperative and thorough. In a description of the rewriting of history Pervez Hoodbhoy and A.H. Nayyar make the point that the concept of the 'ideology of Pakistan', a phrase used by the Jamat-i-Islami in its manifesto in 1951, became the focal point of ideology. Part of this ideology was that Pakistan was made for Islam (not just for Muslims but in order to create an Islamic state and society); M.A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was not secular in his political views but really wanted a religious state; and the essence of the Pakistani identity was religion and not ethnic nationalism. The revised textbooks were even less liberal than those of previous regimes with Islam (of a ritualistic type), chauvinism and militarism as their major components. Hoodbhoy and Nayyar sum up the changes as follows:

> *…… in Pakistan, because of the adoption of an exclusivist national ideology, there are no constraints on the free expression of communal hatred. Thus, the Hindu is portrayed as monolithically cunning and treacherous, obsessively seeking to settle old scores with his erstwhile masters. This Hindu is responsible for the breakup of Pakistan (Hoodbhoy and Nayyar 1985: 175).*

Language Policy in the 1950s

The Urdu committees kept emphasizing Urdu despite the opposition to it in East Bengal. In Dacca, one year after the first phase of the Bengali language movement in 1948, the Advisory Board of Education set up an Urdu committee under the chairmanship of Abdul Haq, the father of Urdu (Baba-e-Urdu). Among its terms of references was the replacement of English by Urdu as a medium of instruction at the university level. The committee decided in 1950 that Urdu shall be a medium of instruction in schools in Punjab, N.W.F.P, centrally administered areas of Karachi and Baluchistan to begin with (ABE 1954: 72). From 1952 it also became the optional medium of instruction at the intermediate level (12th years of education) at the colleges affiliated with the Punjab, Peshawar and Karachi universities (ABE 1954: 65).

Part of the drive for creating a Pakistani-Muslim identity was the marginalization of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. Among these Bengali posed the greatest threat being the language of 54.6 per cent Pakistanis according to the census of 1951 (Statement 4-B, p.71). The state did this through several language planning policies (LP).

First, was status planning. English had the status of the official language and Urdu, it was declared, would be the sole national language. Second was acquisition planning -- the strategy to increase the use and users of a language through language-teaching. Connected with teaching were activities like standardizing a language, creating new terms in it to express modern concepts (neologism) -- and spreading its use through dictionaries and books of grammar i.e corpus planning. All these forms of LP were undertaken by the state.

Among the corpus planning activities undertaken by the state was the Islamization of Bengali. The East Bengal government set up a language committee on 7 December 1950 and it recommended the use of non-Sanskritized Bengali. But after 1948 the East Bengalis mistrusted such changes. Above all they feared that the script of their language, being very close to the Devanagari script of Hindi, would be changed to the Nastaleeq Perso-Arabic script of Urdu. Such apprehensions were expressed in the legislative assembly, the press and by the students of Dhaka University (LAD-B 01 Mar 1951: 61; *Pakistan Observer* 10 April 1949 and Umar 1970: 204). The government, thereupon, took no action but the apprehensions were not entirely ill founded. Even as late as 21 January 1952, exactly a month before the language crisis led to riots in Dhaka (21 February), the 4th meeting of the Urdu Committee with Abdul Haq as chair recommended that a uniform script be adopted for national and `regional' languages. Bengali, the major language of Pakistan at that time was classified as `regional', the idea that its script should be changed was mooted at various levels (ABE 1954: 79).

A small experiment was, indeed, conducted in this regard. The central government established `twenty adult education centres in different parts of East Pakistan to teach primary Bengali through Arabic script' (Islam 1986: 152; *Pakistan Observer* 4 October 1950). However, since 1940, the medium of instruction in high schools had been Bengali in the Devanagari-based script (RPI- Bengal 1951 :19) so this experiment proved a failure. Apart from that Urdu was introduced as a classical language in high schools and Urdu medium classes were opened in Jessore and Khulna (RPI- Bengal 1952 : 2). These schools, however, catered for non-Bengali children such as the Bihari refugees from India (RPI-Bengal 1956: 11) or West Pakistani employees. Surprisingly, however, the *East Bengal Report on Public Instruction 1952-53* was curiously silent about the greatest upheaval of its time -- the Bengali language movement of 1952. Indeed, it confined itself to the following laconic, and under the circumstances rather perverse statement:

> *Urdu, then the proposed only state Language of Pakistan was introduced in Middle classes as a compulsory subject. English was, however, abolished upto class V which was now merged into the primary stage (RPI-Bengal 1958 : 17).*

The report of 1953-54 also unrepentantly reported that Urdu had been added `from class IV to upward as a compulsory subject in the compulsory areas and as an optional subject in the non-compulsory areas' (RPI-Bengal 1959a: 12). Thus, Bengali-speaking students had to learn Urdu even after their own language, Bengali, had become the other national language of Pakistan in 1956. While official documents equitably declared that while Urdu was compulsory for Bengalis, Bengali was compulsory for `Urdu-speaking pupils' (RPI-Bengal 1959b: 12), the fact was that state support made Urdu much more ubiquitous in Pakistani cities, especially in the official domains, than any other Pakistani language. Thus, anyone with any social ambition found it necessary to learn Urdu. This meant that, while pragmatic people, even if they were Bengali language activists, had to learn Urdu they also felt that their language, and so their identity, were unjustly marginalized because of an iniquitous language teaching policy.

The Bengali language movement led to no fundamental change in the centrist policies of the ruling elite. Indeed, the very worse took place. The consolidation of the provinces of the western wing into one-unit, the province of West Pakistan, in 1955 (WPO 1955) presented a united front to East Pakistan. While confronting ethnicity in this manner, this policy provoked the nationalists in West Pakistan -- the Sindhi, Pakhtun and Balochi-Brahvi ethno-nationalists -- to confront the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated centre even more aggressively than before. The rise of language-based ethnic movements has, however, been described elsewhere (Rahman 1996). What needs to be described now is how the state made language-teaching policies in the light of the increased emphasis on centrism.

Ayub Khan's Language Policy

In 1958 when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law he declared that `a strong central government' was `an absolute MUST' (Gauhar 1993: 163). This was quite expected considering that in his `appreciation' of 1954 he had written:

> *..... West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from the North or South, must be welded into one unit and all artificial provincial boundaries removed, regardless of any prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real (Khan 1967:187).*

However, Ayub had genuflected to what he called the `prejudices' of the people. Thus he had conceded that West Pakistan should `be so sub-divided that each sub-unit embraces a racial group or groups with common economy, communications and potentiality for development, and administration decentralized in them to the maximum possible' (Ibid 187). In practice, of course, this was a contradiction in terms. The disappearance of symbolic names -- such as Sindh, Punjab etc -- and the devaluation of the indigenous languages of different areas were calculated to strengthen the cultural and political domination of the centre which, in practice, meant the symbolic domination of Urdu and the urban culture of the Urdu-speaking *ashraf* (gentlemanly class).

Ayub Khan's Commission on National Education (appointed 30 December 1958 and submitted report on 26 August 1959) made its centrist language policy quite clear. Strengthening the position of `national' languages -- which were Bengali and Urdu now -- the report said:

> *We are firmly convinced that for the sake of our national unity we must do everything to promote the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by developing the national language, Urdu, to the fullest extent. In the areas of the former Punjab, Bahawalpur and Baluchistan, Urdu is already the medium of instruction at the primary stage, and this arrangement should continue. Urdu in this way will eventually become the common popular language of all the people in this area. (RNE 1959: Chapter 21, para 14, p. 284).*

As Urdu was to be introduced from 1963 as the medium of instruction in Sindhi-medium schools from class 6, the only language which would really be affected was Sindhi. Pashto too was not be used as medium of instruction after class 5, but it was used only in a few rural schools while Sindhi was used in many more schools, especially in rural Sindh. Thus the Sindhis reacted aggressively to the proposed changes and succeeded in having some of them blocked (for details see Rahman 1996: 116).

Ayub Khan's own stance, and that of the officer corps of the army, was modernist and westernized. It was not that they accepted the liberal humanist values of the West and really believed in democracy but they did disapprove of values, traditions and attitudes of the past. Thus, for them, orthodox and revivalist interpretations of Islam; indigenous culture and language-based ethnicity were reactionary throwbacks to the past. English, on the other hand, was the language of modernization and progressive values. To combat the mullahs (as the *ulema* were pejoratively labelled) the army and the bureaucracy supported English medium instruction. To combat ethnicity, which was stigmatized as `provincialism', the regime had to fall back upon Urdu in West Pakistan and even had to recruit Islam in the nationalist cause.

Ayub Khan's policy about religious eduation was clearly nationalist and secular. It was meant to use Islam to promote nationalist objectives such as the creation of a distinctive Pakistani identity, national integration and so on. The 1959 report on education stated:

> *Religious education should do nothing which would impair social and political unity in the country. On the other hand, it should strenthen this unity by developing a spirit of tolerance (RNE 1959: 211).*

For the *ulema*, however, the theological objectives were the foremost. And, because they were so salient the differences over the interpretation of theological doctrines were also significant. Thus, Ayub Khan's nationalist aims were extraneous to the *ulemas*' worldview. It belonged, as it were, to the alien worldview brought into the Muslim world by Western colonialism. The state was, to be sure, contingent upon this secular worldview but then the very reason the *ulema* had chosen to alienate themselves from the state was precisely because the state was secular.

Ayub Khan's policy was, as Jamal Malik has pointed out, an attempt at the `colonialization of Islam' (Malik 1996) and the *ulema* reacted to it. The ethno-nationalists, and not only they but the supporters of Urdu too, also reacted (Abdullah 1976:57) to Ayub Khan's toying with the idea that all languages of Pakistan be written in the Roman script (Khan 1967: 85).

While the script remained unchanged more public schools and cadet colleges were opened to train future leaders through English rather than the vernacular-medium state schools. Ayub Khan personally justified the establishment of these elitist institutions in the name of efficiency and modernization.

The state defended English in the name of efficiency and modernization and was really concerned when some universities started replacing English by Urdu or other languages as a medium of instruction and

examination. Karachi University had declared early in 1963 that by 1967-68 all teaching and examinations in post-graduate, technical and professional subjects will be in Urdu. It had set up an implementation committee to see that this change took place efficiently. Since 1957 a Bureau of Composition, Compilation and Translation too had been functioning in the university and technical terms were said to exist to facilitate the changeover. However, the university did not suddenly abandon Urdu. Its relevant statute read as under:

> *Statute 28. Medium of Instruction and Examination : The medium of instruction and examination shall be English or Urdu.*

The university also decided `to strengthen teaching of English (whenever necessary) to enable Pakistani students to use the language with greater facility'. Also, knowledge of English Scientific and Technical Terms, along with their Urdu equivalents, has been made compulsory for all students' (Karachi University 1963 in Abdullah 1976: 77-78).

But what the Ayub Khan government objected to was the spirit of the change. Karachi University had begun teaching in Urdu from 1963; it intended to introduce it at the highest examining and teaching levels; it proposed using 400 books of Osmania University; it wanted to work with other pro-Urdu organizations such as the Markazi Majlis-e-Taraqqi Adab (Lahore) and produce glossaries of technical terms and, most defiantly of all, even teach Urdu to foreign students on the grounds that `every foreign university presupposes adequate knowledge of that country's language' (ibid in Abdullah 1976: 78). Other universities too had moved away from English in various degrees. The Punjab University gave the option of answering questions in Urdu and English to B.A students in 1965 and M.A ones in 1967. Sind University had allowed not only Urdu but also Sindhi both for answering questions in B.A but also for teaching. Peshawar University retained English but taught and examined Islamic studies, Arabic and Urdu through the medium of Urdu (RCSP 1966: 111-115).

The Report was highly critical of these changes. It charged Karachi with discrimination and disobedience. The first because Bengali students were denied their right to study in Bengali and the second because the central government had directed universities not to change the medium of instruction in technical and scientific subjects. The University of Sind was castigated in terms which stung the Sindhi nationalists to the quick. The report said:

> *Sind University has gone to the extent of permitting the use of Sindhi for answering pass and honours examination papers, thus equating a regional language in this respect with the national language (RCSP 1966: 114).*

The report also mentioned that such a change would be unfair to the English-medium students but this, perhaps the major reason for the highly critical stance adopted in the report, was camouflaged by the plea of the rights of the Bengalis and `a heterogeneous multilingual population' in Karachi (RCSP 1966:116). In the end the gloves come off and the report recommends that `no university should be permitted to' change the medium of instruction till a committee of a minister and a secretary -- i.e high state-functionaries -- do not advise such a step (ibid 117). In short, the Pakistani ruling elite had done what the British did when Sir Syed and the Anjuman-i-Punjab wanted vernacular-medium universities to be established in the nineteenth century -- it put its foot firmly down (Rahman 1996: 43-46).

Language-Teaching after Ayub

The next attack on English proved to be rhetorical. Air Marshal Nur Khan first broached the subject of there being `barriers of privilege' between the vernacular and the English-medium students (PNEP 1969: 3; 15-17). But later, in the New Education Policy of 1970, he did not propose anything concrete about this issue. As there was already a recommendation in the Pakistan Provincial Constitution Order (which the new military ruler General Yahya Khan, had promulgated) that in 1972 a commission would recommend whether English be replaced as an official language, nothing further was done about it. As a chapter of my book and an article (Rahman 1996: chapter 13 and Rahman 1997) describe the way English survived Bhutto's socialism, Zia ul Haq's Islamic martial law and the somewhat imperfect democratic interlude Pakistan has experienced since then, it would be pointless to go into the details of that controversy.

It should, however, be mentioned that Urdu became more and more closely associated with Islam, Pakistani nationalism and support of the military as time went by. The middle class Urdu press, especially the daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, the textbooks of social studies and those of Urdu concentrated upon these themes in order to create strongly a nationalistic Pakistani who would support militarization with religious fervour. Thus, when in 1988 the Ministry of Education took the citizens' views about educational policies, most of those who replied (mostly middle class people), supported Urdu medium schooling and the abolition of elitist English schools. However, alongwith this, they also supported restricting womens' freedom; witch hunting of free thinkers; compulsory military training and even more Islamic and nationalistic emphasis in the curricula than the state already provided (Shaikh et.al 1989). Fifty five school teachers, whose opinion was polled by a sampling procedure in 1981-82, agreed that the English curriculum reflected the ideology of Pakistan (Curriculum 1982: 31). These school teachers were themselves the products of state Urdu-medium schools. In short, those who supported Urdu were not liberal-democrats while those who supported English and liberal values mostly were from Westernized and elitist backgrounds.

Like all previous governments, Yahya Khan's government also emphasized the `role of eduation in the preservation and inculcation of Islamic values as an instrument of national unity and progress' (NEP 1970:1). In short, as in Ayub Khan's time, religion would continue to be used to create nationalism. This meant that language-teaching textbooks would continue to reinforce the nationalist messages of the history and social studies textbooks. Pakistani nationalism would be identified closely with Islam which, in turn, would be used to support the military.

The PPP's Language-Teaching Policy

No significant change occured in this policy during the PPP government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Despite his own socialist and liberal rhetoric Bhutto did not want to alienate the military nor the other members of the establishment. Further, he too found Islam and Urdu useful as integrative symbols against the threat of ethnic breakup.

The general objectives of the education policy of 1972-1980 were:

1. Ensuring the preservation, promotion and practise of the basic ideology of Pakistan and making it a code of individual and national life.
2. Building up national cohesion through education and by promoting social and cultural harmony compatible with our basic ideology (English 1976: 2-3).

The textbooks on Urdu state emphatically that the teachers should ensure that the ideology of Pakistan should never be made to appear controversial and further:

> *In the teaching material no discrimination should be made between the religous and the mundane, but that material be presented from the Islamic point of view [original in Urdu] (Urdu 1974: 12).*

Thus, the Bhutto regime, despite the fact that Bhutto himself opposed the *ulema* both politically and intellectually, also used the same pedagogic political strategies as the previous regimes. These strategies were favoured, not just because Bhutto did not want to annoy the *ulema* unnecessarily, but because they had always been used to counter the ethnic threat. Thus, despite socialist and democratic rhetoric, Bhutto did not allow the National Awami Party to rule the N.W.F.P and Balochistan for long. Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto and Balochi were elective languages in classes IX-X but their textbooks had to reinforce the state's overall policy objectives. A pamphlet of 1976 on the curriculum of the `regional languages' states that the courses in these languages should `promote national integration and national cohesion' and that the contribution of each province in the freedom movement was to be noted. So wary were the policy makers about these languages -- presumably because ethnic sentiments had been expressed in them -- that the pamphlet on the curricula of these languages has the following words written in ink on the first page:

> *Certified that I have received this curriculum report and the report does not contain objectionable/political material and that there is nothing in the report which is repugnant to the Ideology of Islam and Pakistan except the material printed in the annexures (Regional 1976 : no pagination).*

Thus, the basic policies of the state -- in language-teaching as in education in general -- remained the same in Bhutto's socialism as in the martial law regimes it had replaced.

Zia ul Haq's Language-Teaching Policy

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite his use of Islam as an integrative symbol and to appease the Islamic lobby, had been opposed by the Pakistan National Alliance which was deeply influenced by the Islamists. When General Zia ul Haq imposed martial law on Pakistan on 05 July 1977 he legitimized himself in the name of Islam. Besides, General Zia did genuinely hold middle class views and a certain somewhat strict understanding of Islam is very often part of middle and lower-middle class worldview in Pakistan. Thus, it may not be true to suggest that Zia ul Haq merely used Islam cynically as a political strategy as Bhutto did. That his use of Islam, for whatever reasons, did help him politically cannot he denied. Further, it cannot also be denied that Zia ul Haq was a product of the colonial sector -- secular schooling, training as an army officer, socialization as an officer of the elitist armoured corps -- and nationalism, efficiency and modernization were very much part of his worldview. This means that there are continuities between Zia ul Haq's policies of Islamizing education and the policies of earlier regimes. The difference, indeed, is that of degree not of kind. This is evident in the following stated aim of the education policy of 1979:

> *To foster in the hearts and minds of the poeple of Pakistan in general and the students in particular a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan and a living consciousness of their spiritual and ideological identity thereby strengthening unity of the outlook of the people of Pakistan on the basis of justice and fairplay (NEP 1979: 2).*

In keeping with this overall objective Urdu is to be used as a medium of instruction `to strengthen ideological foundations of the nation and to foster unity of thought, brotherhood and patriotism' (ibid 2).

While this was merely rhetorical, there was at first a policy departure from previous eras. The Ministry of Education was asked to review `all the textbooks prescribed by the English medium schools' (ibid 57). Even more radically, the English-medium schools would start teaching everything in Urdu and even the nomenclature of `English-medium' would be abolished (NEP 1979 : 59). This was the greatest boost the status of Urdu had ever received. Indeed, the boost came in two ways. First, against the other indigenous languages of Pakistan on the grounds that:

> *Urdu became a great repository of Muslim culture and acquired the status of a lingua franca most extensively employed as a common link language by people speaking various languages and dialects from Torkhum to Karachi (NEP 1979: 59).*

Even now it was conceded that primary education could be in an approved provincial language but the `switchover to the National language as medium of instruction is the ultimate aim' (ibid 60). This was a departure from previous language-teaching policies in that even Ayub Khan had not stated so forthrightly that the `provincial' languages would be supplanted at all levels by Urdu.

Second, the policy about replacing English by Urdu was a major deviation. The most startling policy statement was as follows:

> *Starting April 1979 all students admitted to class 1 in all English medium schools will undergo instruction through the medium of Urdu or an approved provincial language, which will be progressively introduced in successive grades thereafter (NEP 1979: 80).*

It was, however, conceded that five years would be given to replace books in English by Urdu ones at the intermediate and degree level and that during the interval the teachers could learn to teach in Urdu instead of English. These, however, were mere details. The basic policy seemed to have changed. The state was to retain English `to keep in touch with modern knowledge' (NEP 1979 : 60) but it would abolish the dual media of instruction. Presumably, then, English would no longer be required for seeking jobs in the state sector in Pakistan and the social symbolic significance of English would be appreciably reduced.

Such a policy was a deviation from the past and, of course, it was opposed. The opposition to Zia's policies and the abandonment of this policy are given in detail elsewhere and will not be dwelt upon here (Rahman 1996: 242). Suffice it to say that Zia ul Haq eventually settled for a language-teaching policy not essentially different from his predecessors. His Islamization drive did increase the Islamic content in all courses, including language-teaching ones, but this was not a case of a radically new policy but of `more of the same'.

It is difficult to prove that Zia ul Haq's eleven years made Pakistanis more Islamic or nationalistic. Empirical evidence in such cases is generally inconclusive. However, the articulate sections of the middle class did express such views, right wing views, more forcefully and more often during and after his rule. As mentioned earlier, in 1988 the Ministry of Education elicited the opinions of citizens about the changes to be made in eduational policies. A large number of people suggested more Islamization, more inculcation of nationalism and some advocated military training. Among the more radical views are:

1. Music should not be taught in schools as a subject.
2. Only Muslim teachers should be appointed at least upto secondary level.

3. Anti-Islamic teachers should be expelled from colleges.
4. Lady teachers should not be allowed to have their hair cut.
5. Islamic studies, Pakistan studies, economic [sic] and military training should be compulsory subjects at college level.
6. The concept of `Jihad' should be given more emphasis in books of Islamiyat.
7. Teachers should be disallowed to speak against Pakistan ideology in the classroom (Shaikh et.al 1989).

In short, an articulate section of the middle class, probably brought up on ideological school courses supported an ideology which used religion to create nationalism and militarism in the society.

Language-Teaching after Zia ul Haq

Zia ul Haq died in August 1988 and the country has seen two governments by Benazir Bhutto and two by Nawaz Sharif (not counting the caretaker interludes) in the last ten years. A number of documents pertaining to education policy have been issued from time to time. On close scrutiny, however, one discovers that they are curiously alike. The Nawaz Sharif education policy of 1992, for instance, reads like a document from Zia ul Haq's time and Benazir Bhutto could well be mistaken for Nawaz Sharif.

The 1995 preface to Teacher Education, for instance, says that the aim of teacher education is `to inculcate the spirit of Islam and develop the qualities of tolerance, universal brotherhood and justice' (ETE 1995 : 1). This was prsumably written during Benazir Bhutto's second term in office (1993-1996). The Education Policy 1998, issued by the second Muslim League Government of Nawaz Sharif, devotes a whole chapter to Islamic Education (Edn 1998: 15-22). Among other things the language-teaching policy remains what the state calls `Islamic'. The Quran, which means only the Arabic text without understanding, will be taught till class 8. It will, however, be taught with meaning from class 6 till class 12. Arabic, which had been made compulsory by Zia ul Haq, remains compulsory in state schools from class 6 to 8. The policy recognises that there is the `traditional sectarian believer who regards his interpretation of religious doctrines as the only valid practice' (Ibid, 16). However, it does not seem to be cognizant of the possibility that increased use of Islam, for whatever reasons, will increase the possibility of people looking at the world through the certitudes of faith. This might mean, among other things, that the `other' will increasingly be seen as a person who deviates from whatever faith one considers true. Oblivious of all this the state continues to use Islam and Urdu to create Pakistani nationalism and unity. The policy does not specifically mention Urdu but it still appears to be compulsory, as it was earlier, from class 1 to class 12. So, despite apparent repudiation of the previous governments' policies, the basic language policy remains the same. It is, indeed, a policy so interlinked with the distribution of power in Pakistan that it cannot change without bringing about unprecedented changes in the power structure.

Urdu Medium Schools

Urdu-medium schools charge no tuition fee at the primary level and the fee at the secondary level, being no more than Rs 12 on the average, is affordable by the poor. Thus, for most children in Pakistan, the experience of schooling comes through the medium of the Urdu language. The classical literature of Urdu is amorous and erotic and it has liberal and left-leaning modernist literature which the Progressive Writers Movement created from the 1930s onwards also. However, the popular Urdu press and school textbooks in Pakistan have associated the language with right wing ideas.

In this chapter we shall attempt to find out what kind of worldview Urdu medium textbooks bring to students. As mentioned earlier, language texts are not the major ideology-burdened texts. They are the social studies texts. That is why previous researchers have concentrated on these texts. K.K. Aziz, the famous Pakistani historian, studied 66 textbooks on social studies, Pakistan studies and history in use in the schools and colleges from class 1 to the B.A level. Among other things, he points out that these textbooks glorify wars and create hatred for India (1993: 192-193). The `bitter fruit' of all this propaganda is summed up by K.K. Aziz as follows:

> *…. the textbooks are training and bringing up the students in ignorance, bias and false logic. Ignorance and bias travel together because one reinforces and encourages the other. Through them the textbooks elevate the prejudices of the society into a set of moral absolutes (Aziz 1993: 243).*

Rubina Saigol, in her study of social studies textbooks from a feminist perspective, agrees with the previous researchers that Pakistani textbooks create myths which help the state maintain a high level of militarization and aggressive nationalism. She further points out that the categories of thought which are reinforced in the textbooks help to support male dominance. Women and working class people are relegated to the same level since they are expected to perform manual, concrete, mechanical and lower order tasks which do not involve original thinking (Saigol 1995). Sibt-e-Hasan, in his study of school texts, also points out that they create hatred for Hindus, blind and fanatical nationalism and the idea that women are only fit for non-intellectual, socially less prestigious, work (Hasan n.d).

A Description of the Texts

The state's major objectives – creating nationalism and support for the military – are attained by repeating a few basic messages in all the books. First, the non-Muslim part of Pakistan is ignored. Second, the borrowing from Hindu culture is either ignored or condemned. Third, the Pakistan movement is portrayed mostly in terms of the perfidy of Hindus and the British and the righteousness of the Muslims. After the partition, in which Hindus are reported to have massacred Muslims while Muslims are not shown to have treated the Hindus in the same manner, India is portrayed as the enemy which is waiting to dismember Pakistan. The separation of Bangladesh in 1971 is portrayed as proof of this Indian policy rather than the result of the domination of the West Pakistanis over East Bengal. Above all, the 1948, 1965 and 1971 wars are blamed entirely on India and Pakistan is shown to have won the 1965 war. The armed forces are not only glorified but treated as if they were sacrosanct and above criticism. All eminent personalities associated with the Pakistan movement, especially M.A. Jinnah and Iqbal, are presented as orthodox Muslims and any aspect of their thoughts or behaviour which does not conform to this image is suppressed. Indeed, the overall effect of the ideological lessons is to make Islam reinforce and legitimise both Pakistani nationalism and militarization. Thus, the state uses the emotive power of religion, patriotism and romanticized history to create a Pakistani identity which supercedes kinship, regional or ethnic identities. By making India the ever-threatening `other' it also uses all these sentiments as well as fear to support a large military, occasional adventurism across the border and nuclear weapons.

As mentioned earlier, the ideology-enforcing items in Pakistani textbooks pertain to Pakistani nationalism and the military or war. The main impression which is conveyed is that all three components belong to a unified, sacred, religious tradition. Even poets of Punjabi, Pashto and Sindhi, whose *sufi* Islam was quite different from the official Islam endorsed by the textbooks, are put into the same ostensibly orthodox tradition. This whole tradition is then dovetailed into Pakistani nationalism. The demand for a separate nation is not made to appear as the product of the desire to escape Hindu domination for economic and

political reasons but an effort to establish a country for the free practice of Islam. Since the Quaid-i-Azam and Iqbal are also converted into upholders of these ideals, Islam supports Pakistani nationalism. The third component of the ideology, the military, is also sacralized because it is contingent upon the first two. The nation, which is a fort of Islam, needs soldiers who are nationalists in as much as they are fighters in the path of Islam. With such a meshing of the secular and religious ideologies the state ensures that the Pakistani citizen is not seduced by ethnic nationalism which bases itself on linguistic or cultural identities. It also ensures that support of the army and war mongering is seen as support of both the nation and Islam. In short, dissent can be equated with both treason and apostasy.

The percentages in (table 1) pertain to the textbooks of Urdu, English, Pashto, Sindhi, Arabic and Persian used in the Urdu schools of Pakistan. The textbooks of Sindhi are used in the schools of rural Sindh whereas those of Pashto are used in some schools of the Pashto-speaking parts of the N.W.F.P. The figures for the percentages of ideological items have been arrived at by the procedure described in section-3.

Table 1:

	NWFP			Punjab & Islamabad			Sind			Balochistan		
	Urdu	English	Pashto	Urdu	English	Arabic	Urdu	English	Sindhi	Urdu	English	Persian
Class 1	20	Nil @	22	6		Not Taught	32	Nil	19	28		Not taught
Class 2	36	7	39	18		NT	41	Nil	42	30		NT
Class 3	50	20	44	31		NT	38	Nil	36	32		NT
Class 4	50	27	66	43		NT	46	Nil	33	47		NT
Class 5	54	Nil	37	38		NT	49	Nil	26	47		NT
Class 6	50	6	46	49	7	NT	49	Nil	34	58	3	16*14
Class 7	44	17	50	52	11	70#	93	Nil	36	46	Nil	47
Class 8	50	26	36	48	8	81	53	20	26	48	4	46 35
Class 9	33+	16	NT	33+	32	50	47+	35	21	25+	23	28+
Class 10	33+	4	NT	33+	33	80	47+	4	21	25+	14	28+

Note:

* Figures on the right in the column for Persian are for books prescribed in the NWFP. Figures on the left are for Balochistan. The new textbooks of the Punjab Board are the same as those of the N.W.F.P Board

\# Arabic books are compulsory for all in Pakistan in 7-10 classes.

@ English starts from class 6 under the old system and in class 1 under the new one. Not all schools have adopted the new system.

\+ Same book for 9th and 10th.

From these figures one can create a hierarchy of language-wise ideological content in Pakistani textbooks. This is given in (table 2) below.

Table 2: Ideological Contents of Language Textbooks expressed as percentages of Total items

Language	Content (in percentages)
Arabic	71
Urdu	40
Pashto	43
Persian	31
Sindhi	29
English	8

The role of Arabic in this context is understandable. It was introduced in Zia ul Haq's period in government schools as part of the Islamization process. But, whereas Arabic textbooks mostly contain Islamic items, those of Urdu contain items on nationalism and the military also. Moreover, Arabic is already associated with Islam but Urdu is perceived as being only a language. Also, while Arabic is only compulsory in middle school, Urdu is read throughout the school years and even in the intermediate classes (ie. 11th and 12th). Thus, it is Urdu which is the primary ideology-carrying language, not Arabic. Persian is not compulsory in the Punjab and Sindh and is, even in the N.W.F.P and Balochistan, only a minor language which students study for three years. Thus, Persian too has little influence on worldview formation. Pashto and Sindhi languages are taught only in some parts of the N.W.F.P and rural Sindh. They are so ideologically burdened, one would surmise, because these areas have had ethnic, language-based movements which the state counters in schools through education. English, always associated with modernity and liberal values, is the least ideology-reinforcing language. However, the percentage of ideological items is quite high in books of classes 7 and 8. Why the overall percentages are less is because in Sindh the books for class 1 to 7 were written by ELT specialists such as Zakia Sarwar, Abbas Hussain, Ambreena Kazi, Kaleem Raza Khan etc. All these writers are liberal academics and the textbooks they have produced are completely devoid of state-sponsored ideological content. One anomaly in all the English text books is that there are two systems of teaching English. According to the older system English began to be taught from class 6. According to the new one English begins in class 1. It was in 1989 that the first Benazir Bhutto's PPP government decided to introduce English as an additional subject from class 1. The decision was implemented in selected schools in the Sindh and NWFP in 1990. The other provinces too accepted the proposal in principle. In NWFP the hurriedly prepared textbooks were used only for one year and then had to be withdrawn. Later on the National English Language Institute (NELI), established in 1987, submitted a new curriculum for English Language Teaching (ELT) for classes 1 to 12 (NELI 1992). However, as the NELI report had predicted, the experiment was not successful. Indeed, NELI itself was abolished and even now all schools do not teach English from class 1. The new system, therefore, runs parallel with the old one in Pakistan. In general, however, English still begins from class 6. Thus, not all children are exposed to very low ideological messages in early childhood. Those who take up English from class 6 are exposed to higher, though not as high as in the case of Urdu, ideological doses.

The way English is taught leaves much to be desired. According to a report of 1982, which evaluated the teaching of English in 20 Urdu-medium high schools in Lahore district, it was found that the students could not speak or understand English nor could they read it for pleasure or write anything creative in it. They could, however, read their lessons and simple sentences in it. Even at this girls were better than boys and the city schools were better than the village ones. In short, state schools do not equip their products in the much needed linguistic skills in English but they do indoctrinate them – mostly through Social Studies and Urdu (Curriculum 1982). The focus of the above analysis has been the ideology of the state rather than that of the society. The distinction between the two is merely the use to which ideas are put. Islam, nationalism and militarism create security for the state – or what the state regards as security – by motivating citizens against ethnic nationalism and India. Societal views, such as are implicit in the privileging of men and educated or dominant people, help to create a view of common sense and normalcy in which women are simply assumed to be inferior and hence to be dominated as are the working classes. A number of studies have analysed images in textbooks which help us understand how these societal views are reinforced[2].

2. Two studies show that in Urdu fiction, both for adults (Parween 1984) and children (Bano 1985), power-oriented values, themes and attitudes are more preponderant than achievement or affiliation oriented ones. Being so focussed on power, macho and militaristic values are easily accepted by students. Indeed, Meher Bano also shows that the NWFP textbooks, like fiction, also show the highest scores for power followed by achievement followed by affiliation (1985: Table 19).

Patriarchy and Class in Textbooks

Muhammad Anwar, for instance, analysed 105 textbooks of the Punjab Textbook Board. His results are that 'the frequency of the appearance of males is 81 percent while females appear only 19 percent of the time. One reason of this could be that 78 percent of the authors were male'(Anwar 1982: 12) and in our male-dominating world public interaction is predominantly among men. Another could be that womens' work is simply ignored. They do work in the fields, graze animals, fetch water and even carry bricks as labourers. However, as women activists often point out, even this substantial contribution to the economy is ignored (SAHE 1997: 55). Perhaps the construction of social reality in our male dominating society is such that all this labour does not register itself as reality in the mind. One reason for this could be that women are supposed to be hidden and men are not used to considering them partners in public interaction. In the analysis by Anwar:

> *Service occupations [cooking, nursing, washing dishes etc] seem to be associated more with females than with males, and such an association is more prominent in Urdu than in English books* (Anwar 1982: 38).

Working class characters, like women, are also less in number. The following table illustrates this:

Social Class	Frequency of Appearance	Percent
High	1552	53.4
Middle	1026	35.3
Low	329	11.3
Total	2907	100

(Anwar 1982: 15)

It may be said that this is only realistic. Any attempts at glorifying working class characters would appear as false and sentimental. What is possible, without inviting cynicism, is to endow marginalized characters with potential qualities which have not been realised as yet. Unfortunately, the qualities of `learned', `rational', `progressive' and `genius' `have been minimally portrayed in female characters' (Anwar 1982: 58) reinforcing the myth that only men can have these qualities. Similarly, qualities of the mind and good manners are not associated with working class people. In short, as some intellectual theorists would have it, women and the `lower classes' correspond to the body; middle and upper class men to the mind. This binary classification creates, and reinforces, a view of reality which is unfair to the working classes and women to begin with.

In this context the society for the Advancement of Education (SAHE) pointed out that women are ignored or negatively portrayed (this is true for the media too[3] (PWI 1982). Those who are in prestigious and traditionally male professions – such as physicians, engineers, architects etc – are ignored. In short, the gender bias against women is evident and all the messages we get, whether from the formal lesson, fiction or the media, reinforces it (SAHE 1997: 56-68).

Efforts to Remove Biases

As far as women are concerned, a change is being made – or, at least, proposed – by some Non-Government Organization (NGOs). SAHE, for instance, conducted workshops of school teachers to

3. A recent journalistic article (Ahmar 1997) shows how Urdu popular fiction reinforces traditional values showing `good' women as demure and docile drudges.

sensitize them to gender bias. In a book written specifically for teachers of primary and secondary schools in simple Urdu and aptly entitled *Main Jaag Uthe* (I woke up) (SAHE 1997), a number of model lessons about women and the necessity of educating and empowering them have been given. The Simorgh Women's Resource and Publication Centre is also engaged in developing materials for schools with human and womens' rights as a focus. Other NGOs, such as Aurat Foundation, also support the production of teaching material without gender bias. Rubina Saigol, Fariha Zafar, Asma Ajmal, Shahla Zia, Asma Jahangir and Neelam Hussain – to name only a few activists – are busy contributing in various ways to the development of such teaching material. It is difficult to know, however, how far the state schools will accept such material and whether it will bring about a real change in male-dominant values. But whether it does or not, those who favour changes in the interest of women welcome such endeavours.

English-Medium Schools

All over the cities of Pakistan one can see boards advertising schools which claim to teach all subjects, except Urdu and Islamic Studies, in English. They are in the most affluent localities but not only in them. Indeed, going by numbers alone, more of them are located in middle class, lower middle class and even in working class areas. Except by the claim made by the boards, they share little else in common. It is a far cry from the rolling green grounds of Aitchison College in Lahore to a two-room house in a slum which advertises itself as the `Oxford and Cambridge Islamic English-medium school'. Indeed, if there is anything which links such diverse establishments together it is that they cater to the persistent public demand for English education. English is still the key for a good future -- a future with human dignity if not public deference; a future with material comfort if not prosperity; a future with that modicum of security, human rights and recognition which all human beings desire. So, irrespective of what the state provides, parents are willing to part with scarce cash to buy their children such a future.

The English-medium schools are of three major types. (a) State-influenced public schools (b) Private elitist schools (c) Private non-elitist schools. Within each category are sub- categories. Indeed, the non-elitist English-medium schools are so varied that they defy classification. Let us, however, focus only on the major categories in order to understand what type of language-teaching is carried out in them. The state-influenced institutions are the great public schools, the federal government model schools and the armed forces schools. The great public schools, like the famous Aitchison College in Lahore, were based upon the aristocratic model of the English public schools. Their function was to produce a loyal, Anglicized, elitist Indian who would understand, sympathise with and support the British *raj* in India (for details see Rahman 1996: Chapter 4). As the military and the higher bureaucracy both came from this elite during the nineteen fifties and sixties, these schools multiplied in Pakistan. The state now invested in creating cadet colleges and public schools. The armed forces were generally involved in the cadet colleges, either as members of the Board of Governors or as administrators and instructors, so that the education, and hence the worldview, of the officer corps of the future as well as other upper middle class functionaries would be under the influence of the state and, more specifically, of the military. Thus the Military College at Jhelum; the Cadet Colleges at Pitaro, Kohat, Razmak, Hasanabdal; the Army Burn Hall College and the Pine Hills College at Ghora Gali are all controlled, in varying degrees, by the armed forces. In addition to that the PAF has its model schools, the Navy has its Bahria colleges and the army has a variety of institutions ranging from schools run by brigades to colleges run by the Fauji Foundation. The federal government has its own model schools and there are elitist public schools under boards of governors such as the Boys Public School and College in Abbottabad and the Sadiq Public School in Bahawalpur. In short, the state has invested heavily in creating a parallel system of education for the elite, especially the elite which would presumably run elitist state institutions in future. The non- elitist system

of education, fully dependent upon the state, functions for the most part in Urdu (or in Sindhi and Pashto at places) and gets step-motherly treatment in the allocation of funds, maintenance of buildings, quality of teachers, provision of facilities and so on. Most significantly, the non-elitist stream of public education functions in the vernacular rather than in English which means, prima facie, that its products would have greater difficulty in the competition for elitist jobs and participation in the elitist domains of power than their English-educated counterparts.

Because of this obvious injustice, the English schools have always been criticized. Ayub Khan, as General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan, was so insensitive to public criticism that he makes the following observation concerning Khwaja Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin's reluctance to establish them. Remarks Ayub:

> *I never understood what they were afraid of. Perhaps they thought that general reaction to the establishment of public schools would not be favourable (Khan, A 1967: 25).*

That it was not a question of `perhaps' was brought home to Ayub Khan when he did establish a number of such schools and resentment was clearly articulated against them.

The state used the vocabulary of social justice to justify the existence of elitist schools. For instance, the *Report of the Commission on National Education* (1959) says:

> *The former Punjab Government, at the initiative of the army, established a pre-cadet college at Hasan Abdal. This provides education of five years from classes VIII to XII with a particular bias towards a career in the defence services. Nearly 33% of the seats are reserved for free students and 33% at half fees, based on a means test. The school is thus able to draw on the best talent from the poorer classes and it has been extremely successful (CNE 1959: 142).*

The Commission was much impressed with Hasanabdal and recommended the establishment of more institutions of its kind. However, the students who rose in revolt against Ayub Khan's education policies did not think that these schools were meant to serve the poor. Thus, the students of East Pakistan went on a massive strike on 17 September 1962 and in Peshawar there were student- led disturbances on 10 and 11 December 1964 (CSPW 1966: 6). Among other things the students demanded that Pakistani languages should be used as media of instruction; that missionary schools be banned; and that all schools should be brought at par (CSPW 1966: Annexure C). In short, what the students really wanted was that the injustice of making some people proficient in a language giving access to the best jobs while neglecting most other people, should come to an end.

The Commission on Students Problems and Welfare, appointed to investigate into these demands, flatly refused to make any changes. About the state-influenced English schools the Commission said:

> *As regards institutions of this type run by the government the general complaint is that the government spends much more on them than the ordinary type of institutions maintained by it. There is some justification for this complaint. Such establishments are intended to produce some better type of students who would be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defence service of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive positions in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and corporations. They have not been in*

> *existence long enough to enable us to judge the quality of their end products, but we cannot help observing that we are unable to appreciate the principle upon which such a discrimination is sought to be made by the government, particularly in view of the constitutional assurance given in paragraph 15 under Right No. VI to the effect that "all citizens are equal before law" (CSPW 1966: 18).*

But such pieties had no effect on the state which kept on investing in such elitist institutions in the name of defence, modernization and efficiency. Even now, the cost of building and running an English school (a cadet college, armed forces school or federal model school), is far more than a vernacular-medium state school.

Private Elitist Schools

In the sixties when the students protested against Ayub Khan's policies the private elitist schools were generally run by the missionaries. They were the famous convents of the Pakistani cities -- Saint Mary's (Rawalpindi); Presentation Convent (Murree); Burn Hall (Abbottabad) – which, in the eyes of vernacular-educated people, had been creating glib- tongued, English speaking, European attired boys and forward young misses. These were at once the envy and despair of their vernacular educated counterparts who now rose against English schools. The students, in their protest against the superior airs of English school students, called them `snobs'. The Commission on Students Welfare observed:

> *We have no evidence that these schools have really produced any such snobs as suggested by the students, nor have we any evidence that their students usually secure better positions in public examinations. We are not, therefore, in a position to say that the continuance of these schools is harmful to the community and that as such, they should be stopped (CSPW: 1966: 18).*

In fact, there is a lot of evidence that the products of such schools came from richer and more powerful families than their vernacular-educated counterparts. This by itself was enough ground for suggesting that they did consider themselves superior to them (vernacular school students) anyway. Moreover, what increased their self-esteem even more was the fact that they did, indeed, fare better in the Inter Services Selection Board (ISSB); the armed forces academies; the superior civil services examination and training and other elitist jobs in the sixties (and now). Even more, they felt that no drawing room, however posh; no club, however exclusive; no organization, however elitist -- both in Pakistan and abroad -- was closed to them. English was far more than a language; it was a badge of status, a marker of elitist upbringing. It gave confidence and even without wishing to sound snobbish, the fluent speakers of English from the English-medium schools (especially from the elitist missionary schools because they spoke even better English than their counterparts from the cadet colleges) appeared snobbish to others.

The novelist Nasir Ahmad Farooqi describes the English- school types very well. They study English literature, or at least the Romantic poets; abbreviate their names to sound like English names; drink in clubs; read *Times* and the English press. `Young men go to Oxford, and return to work for the Government or British companies' (Farooqi 1968:9). Their tastes are English and they think it no disgrace not to be able to write their mother tongue better than English. Indeed, if that mother tongue is Punjabi, it is often considered not respectable enough to be used on any formal occasion and, in some cases, even at home. This being so, Vittachi's perception that such people were Brown Sahibs was not very far from the truth (1987). And, of course, Brown Sahibs did appear as stuck-up and snobbish to the common people. Thus the students did have a point, which the representatives of the state did not accept, when they

complained that elite schools created snobs. This point was, however, accepted by a later government report -- the one which was presided over by Air Marshal Nur Khan -- when it conceded that there was `almost a caste-like distinction between those who feel at ease in expressing themselves in English and those who do not' (PNEP 1969: 14). This `ease' was a matter of style, mannerism and worldview. The English school students talked in English, very often in slang borrowed from comic books, informally with each other. Their body-language was different from that of other students. For instance, they did not shake hands in the manner of other people. While the others put in much warmth in hand shakes and shook every males' hand, English school products shook hands much more casually and often merely waved at people standing away. They (the English school people) never did the double hand-shake nor did they bend their body as a gesture of humility when they shook hands. Other aspects of the body language -- the gait, the way one sits down, drinks, eats etc -- of both type of people are also different though some differences can only be seen but can not be described easily. What is most important is that the products of English schools thought differently from their vernacular-school products; that there was a difference in worldview between them. To this difference, as it is relevant for us at present, we will come later.

Before ending this section it must be pointed out that the convents are no longer seen as the most elitist of the English- medium private schools. Their place has now been taken over by private Pakistani schools. Among the most well known school chains of this kind are the Beaconhouse and the City School systems. Other such schools in Islamabad are Roots, Froebels, Arts and Science Academy, Khaldunia School and so on. These schools first came up in the eighties and are multiplying even now.

The Private Non-Elitist Schools

By far the largest number of so-called English-medium schools are English-medium only in name. According to a 1987 survey of Rawalpindi-Islamabad there were 60 English-medium schools in Islamabad and 250 in Rawalpindi. Out of these 250 only 39 were recognised schools (Awan 1987). Their fees ranges between Rs. 50 to Rs. 500 per month which is far higher than the average state vernacular school but far lower than that of the elitist private English school. In these schools a pretence is made of teaching most subjects in English but the teachers themselves are neither from English schools nor otherwise qualified to teach anything but English of a rudimentary kind through rote-learning and spoon feeding methods. In general teachers write answers of all subjects on the board which students faithfully copy, memorise and reproduce in the examination.

Curricula of State-influenced English-Medium Schools

The Federal Government Model schools, cadet colleges, elitist public schools and armed forces schools teach English at a higher standard than the vernacular-medium schools. However, the public schools, mindful of their elitist reputation, try to supplement the Textbook Board's prescribed books with other ones. From 9th, however, they adhere to the prescribed syllabi which are meant to promote Pakistani nationalism and an Islamic consciousness as I will bring out later.

The products of these schools are, in any case, less Westernized than those of the elitist English schools -- especially schools with students from Westernized families. They are also not fluent in English. In the Army Burn Hall, where the author was a student between 1960-1965, students used to speak English with each other and with the teachers. Now, however, they do not. The principal, however, said that he still used English with the students (Arshad 1997). This is more or less the situation in other similar schools.

The products of these schools, especially those which are run or influenced by the armed forces, are more nationalistic and militaristic than their counterparts from the private elitist English schools. This is not, however, the consequence of the texts they read but also because their teachers, families and peers come from professional, middle-class backgrounds whose worldview has been shaped by urban, state-created intellectual forces rather than foreign ones.

Even upto class 9th the students of state-influenced English schools are exposed to the Pakistani worldview through texts, interaction with teachers, family and peers. From class 9 onwards all the books they study are prescribed by textbook boards. They do study subjects in English -- in some schools, however, Pakistan Studies is in Urdu -- but their books are saturated with the state-sponsored ideology.

The main Urdu textbook is *Muraqqa-e-Urdu* which has a number of essays on Islamic personalities, historical personages from the Pakistan movement and war heroes. There is a slim section on poetry but amorous verse -- which constitutes the best *ghazals* -- is conspicuous by its absence.

The English texts are of a similar kind. Apart from the usual essays on the historical personalities there are essays on Siachin -- represented as a triumph of heroism. In short, the ideological content of English texts is not much different from Urdu ones. There may be, however, some difference in the way different teachers indoctrinate their students. The common perception of a large number of students and teachers is that the teachers of Urdu are more orthodox, supportive of middle-class, Islamic and nationalist values than teachers of English. The teachers' values and attitudes, however, generally reflect his or her class background, socialization, education and personality. Since puritanical Islam, chauvinism and militarism are supported by the middle classes, especially the educated lower middle class, teachers from this background tend to incorporate their class worldview into their teaching.

The Curricula of Elitist English-medium Schools

The curricula of the elitist English-medium schools and the other English-medium schools is different. Let us first take the curricula of elitist schools like Beaconhouse, City School, Froebels (Islamabad) and so on. The books on English and Urdu -- the only languages taught in the schools -- are generally not of the Pakistani Textbook Boards till class-9 and then only if the student wants to appear in the Pakistani matriculation examination. Till then all children study books published by the Oxford University Press. Some books have been especially reprinted for Pakistan but the changes made in them are minor -- the clothes of women are Pakistani and characters sometimes have Pakistani names -- while other books are really meant for a Western readership. These texts socialise a child into English- speaking Western culture. Children read about such classics as *Lorna Doone*, *Little Women*, *Wuthering Heights* and *Tom Brown's Schooldays* and famous figures like Florence Nightingale and so on. The world portrayed here is Western, middle class and successful. It is a secular world of nuclear families where the household chores are generally performed by women though they are sometimes seen as doing other work too. The overwhelming message of the texts is liberal and secular. Concepts like the segregation or veiling of women, ubiquitous religiosity, sectarianism or ethnicism get no support.

The Urdu textbooks, also published by private publishing houses, are different from those prescribed by government textboards. According to one textbook writer children are not keen to learn Urdu, whereas they show no aversion to English, because the textbooks of Urdu are not colourful and

interesting. Accordingly a very colourful series of textbooks has been produced. There are also series of story books, featuring pillow fights and concern about animal life, to supplement the main texts. None of these books have Islamic or nationalistic lessons. However, the *Nazdban-e-Urdu* series, do contain essays on Islamic historical personages, Pakistani nationalism and the 1965 war. As this series is used in a number of schools the students are introduced to the dominant official ideology of Pakistan through language-teaching though, of course, not to the extent their government school counterparts are.

As for the schools in the third, as it were *lumpen* category, they are more or less close to the vernacular medium schools than the English schools which they claim to be. This is because their fees structure and lack of facilities attract students from social backgrounds where English is hardly used. Similarly, their salary structure only attracts teachers who are not fluent, indeed not even tolerably conversant, with English at all. Curricula and examinations, however, are only one aspect of teaching English. The second aspect is the quality of teaching and the third, and most important, is the frequency of informal interaction with English-using people. Formal training of teachers appears to me to be far less important than their command of the language. The salaries of schools, even of elitist schools, are not attractive enough for men from elitist English-using backgrounds. Women, especially women from affluent families, are, however, attracted by these salaries because they do not have to support the whole family only on their income.

If these women are from English-using backgrounds, they speak to their students both within the class room and outside in a natural manner in English. This provides the students the key component of interaction with English-using people -- something which less Anglicized schools lack.

But even more important than the teachers are students, playmates and members of the family as far as informal interaction is concerned. If they are from English-using backgrounds the child gets exposure to English not only in the classroom but also outside it. Indeed, it is this exposure which makes the crucial difference between a child from a good English-medium school and a mediocre one. The former learns to interact in English in an informal way. His or her English is spontaneous and the way it is pronounced is different from the English of other Pakistanis in ways I have described in my book *Pakistani English* (1990) earlier. Thus fluency and spontaneity in the use of English is not so much a product of courses of study, techniques of teaching and examinations. It is, above all, a product of exposure to English in the informal domain. But this exposure cannot be provided in the school alone no matter how hard the teachers work and whichever books are prescribed. It is, in the last analysis, a byproduct of power -- of Anglicization which is the preserve of powerful and affluent people. They use English at home and their children are exposed to it even before joining school. Women from these families, educated in elitist English schools themselves, become English-using teachers and provide role models for their pupils. The whole atmosphere of school, playground and home is English-using. Even the leisure hours of the children expose them to English. They watch English cartoons; read English comic books; English childrens' fiction; English popular fiction and are constantly exposed to the CNN, BBC and TV programmes in English. Thus, children in rich and expensive English schools, but not in similar schools in less affluent or less Anglicized areas, become fluent and spontaneous in English. In short, command over English is closely dependent upon power and its corollaries -- Anglicization of culture, possession of wealth and so on. Thus, command over English is highest in the elitist schools followed by the state-influenced English schools, the non-elitist English schools and is least in the vernacular medium schools.

In short, the children of English schools can be roughly divided into two kinds. The products of the elitist private schools, especially those which have a large majority of children from Westernized elitist homes; and those of the state-influenced schools. There are, of course, shades between these rough categories nor is any category definable in a precise way. Very roughly, then, the former are more Westernized than other Pakistani children. The negative consequence of this is that they are alienated from Pakistan, especially from its indigenous languages and cultures. This makes some of them look down upon most things indigenous. While such people are neither aware nor in sympathy with the values, feelings and aspirations of their countrymen they are generally believers in liberal-humanist and democratic values. Thus they are less susceptible to sectarian prejudices or the persecution of Hindus, Ahmadis and non-Muslims in Pakistan. Being less exposed to nationalistic and militaristic propaganda they are also less prone than others to India-bashing and undue glorification of war and the military.

The products of the state-influenced English schools have more in common with middle class urban Pakistanis than the ones we have just described. However, like them, they too are alienated from villagers and have little understanding of the indigenous cultures of the country. They are not susceptible to sectarian prejudices but, being nationalistic and militaristic, they are quite anti-Hindu, anti-India and supportive of the military.

All the products of English schools, even those which are English-medium only in name, agree in regarding themselves as an elite -- not of money and power, which some of them are, but that of talent and knowledge. They hold the government vernacular medium schools in open contempt. Indeed, to be `Urdu medium' or `*Paendoo*' [rustic], is a term of derision among them. The English schools, then, produce snobs with only one redeeming feature -- some of these snobs, because of their liberal-humanist values, support human rights, democracy and freedom.

Madrassas

The *madrassas* (or *madaris*) are religious seminaries which have been in the news in the last two years for two major reasons. First, their students, called *tulaba* in Arabic and *taliban* in Pashto, rose to rule most of Afghanistan. And second, because they are allegedly responsible for creating, or at least fanning, sectarian conflict in Pakistan between the Shias and the Sunnis. What goes on in the *madrassa*, then, is significant for understanding Pakistani society. This chapter, however, does not attempt to provide understanding of either the Taliban phenomenon or sectarian violence. What it attempts to do is much more modest i.e to provide an account of language-teaching in the Pakistani *madrassas*. This should be useful for scholars not only because there is no academic study of this phenomenon in English and this study fills a gap in our knowledge, but also because it helps us understand how language-teaching helps to reinforce the worldview which makes the products of *madrassa* education behave the way they do in Pakistan.

The Establishment of Madrassas in India

There were *madrassas* in India since the beginning of Muslim rule (Nadwi 1936). However, in British India the *madrassas* became a response to the dominance of the West. The essence of this response was to create a little oasis of orthodoxy in the midst of the heterodoxy created by the `colonial' sector (to use Jamal Malik's term). One of the reasons for the founding of Darul Uloom at

Deoband was to prevent the domination of the Western worldview through the newly established system of English education. Thus the constitution of Deoband declares that one of its aims is:

> *To preach and disseminate Islam and to preserve and defend the religion; to propagate Islam through writing and speech; and to cultivate in the Muslims; through education and preaching the morals, actions and sentiments as those of "the best decades" (Khayr al-qarun) and the pious ancestors.*

Another one refers specifically to governmental influence. It is:

> To keep off and avoid the influences of the government and to maintain the freedom of thought and knowledge (Rizvi 1980: 108).

Maulana Qasim Nanautavi, in a prize-distribution function, said that the Darul Uloom was established because `religious knowledge was about to come to an end' in India. When the *madrassah* was opened (ibid 109). Some British reporters were impressed with the teaching at Deoband (Letter of John Palmer in Rizvi 1980: 135).

To qualify for the Arabic course of eight years, the student had to study a primer called the *Qa'ida-e-Baghdadi* the purpose of which was to make him literate in the Quran. After memorizing, or at least reading, the Quran, the student learned Urdu and Persian. For four years the students are taught the fundamentals of Islam and Arithmetic in Urdu. This was the Urdu Diniyyat class. Next to that was the Persian class in which primary books of Persian prose and poetry, arithmetic, geography, Hindi and Arabic grammar were taught for four years. There is a department of modern sciences in which the English language and contemporary sciences were taught for one year. Rizvi's book, from which the above information is taken, does not supply any details about this course (Rizvi 1981: 210-211).

But so powerful, clearly structured and efficient was the modern sector that the *ulema* could not totally resist its intrusion even into the *madrassas* which were supposed to lock the modern world out. There were, therefore, many concessions to modernity. For one, the examination system was established at Darul uloom Deoband and the Nadwat ul Ulema -- the primary *madrassas* of Muslim India[4]. The other, and even more significant, was the way Urdu -- a language promoted by the British state in the domains of formal learning -- replaced Persian in the *madrassas*. Indeed, the *ulema* adopted Urdu not only for teaching but for writing their sermons and tracts to the extent that Urdu became associated with Islam in South Asia (Metcalf 1982: 206-210, 215). Indeed, even the Burmese Muslims claimed it as an Islamic language and argued that their religious books were written in it (EII 1930: 42). The Nadwat ul ulema included both Urdu and English in their syllabi (Shahabi n.d: 156). Other *madrassas* in India too began teaching Urdu, Hindi and English to fulfil the needs of modern times in the Indian content (Shahabi n.d: 160).

The British state ignored the *madrassas* but its policy of not giving high-status jobs to the *maulanas* effectively led to their having a low social status. The Pakistani state continued this policy but, as mentioned earlier, also tried to `colonialize' them. `Colonialization' is defined by Jamal Malik to mean that `the regime not only expands into hitherto untouched areas and thus colonizes them, as, for example shrines and religious schools, but also aims at traditionalizing colonial structures such as the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Zakat system' (Malik 1996: 24). This policy expands the

4. However, questions were asked and, at some places, examinations were given. Indeed, Mohammad Adil Shah, ruler of Bijapur (South India), is said to have instituted annual examinations (Shahabi n.d: 130).

power of the state in hitherto untouched sectors thus changing their nature. But such a policy, one could also argue, also Islamizes the society. Thus, in the attempt to incorporate the *madrassas* and other Islamic institutions the state recognised and disseminated values which resulted in a higher acceptance of the values of the *ulema* by people not educated in *madrassas*

Madrassas in Pakistan

In 1957-58 there were only 119 *Madrassas* with 4,790 students, however, according to a report of 1988 the total number of religious seminaries in Pakistan were 2,891 and their breakdown, sect and province-wise was as follows:

Table 3: Breakdown of Madrassas

Province	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahl-e-Hadith	Shi'ah	Others	Total of Provinces
Punjab	590	548	118	21	43	1320
NWFP	631	32	5	2	8	678
Sindh	208	61	6	10	6	291
Baluchistan	278	34	3	1	31	347
Azad Kashmir	51	20	2	-	3	76
Islamabad	51	20	-	2	3	76
Northern Areas	60	2	27	11	3	103
Total of Sects	1,869	717	161	47	97	2,891

Source: Report 1988

In 1995 the number had grown to 3,906 (Directory 1995: 282) and it is still growing though the Minister of Education, in his reply to a question as to the number of *madrassas*, gave the same number even on 11 November 1997 (Senate 11 November 1997). The *madrassas* follow their own traditional courses with a few, generally minor, changes here and there. In the Sunni *madrassas*, which are in vast majority in Pakistan, a modified form of the *Dars-e-Nizami* is still taught (Sufi 1941 : 73). The duration of the course is between 6 to 17 years from the *Ibtedaiyah* (primary) to the *Takmeel (Daura-e-Hadith*) which is now considered equivalent to M.A in Arabic and Islamic Studies. However, a *Maulvi Fazil* who had passed the usual course based on *Dars-e-Nizami* at the *madrassa* was to be given a B.A degree only if he had passed the ordinary B.A examination in English (LAD-P 9 April 1982: 26).

Languages Taught in Madrassas

The focus of education in the *madrassas* is Islam – or, rather, Islam as interpreted by a sect or a sub-sect (Malik 1996). Languages are not taught for their intrinsic worth but because they aid religious learning or may be necessary for a religious scholar. For this purpose Arabic, of course, occupies the centre stage. Persian, which was socially and academically necessary in Muslim India, still forms part of the curriculum. Urdu is generally the medium of instruction in Pakistani *madrassas*. However, in the Pashto-speaking parts of the N.W.F.P, Pashto is the medium of instruction while Sindhi is the medium of instruction in many *madrassas* in the Sindhi-speaking parts of Sindh (Report 1988).[5] Urdu, however, is generally the language in which *madrassa* students become most competent in most of the *madrassas*. English is not taught to all *madrassa* students though the government has been encouraging its teaching as we shall see later. When it is taught, it is taught to very few students (2.87 per cent) and government

5. The medium of instruction in parts of Sind is Sindhi : At least one *madrassa* out of a sample of 50 reported using Siraiki in Southern Punjab. All teachers of junior classes use the local language for explanation no matter what the medium of instruction is -- field investigation and survey of 50 *madrassas* during April – May 1997.

text books are used for the purpose. See table 4 below for a summary of information on language-teaching in the *madrassas*.

Languages, like all other subjects, are taught through memorization. The teacher repeats lessons from a book which the students memorize. Sometimes a bright student performs the same function. At the higher level, however, the teacher delivers a lecture (*wa'az*) in the style of a sermon. A good *wa'az* is one which is distinguished by the use of oratorical devices and refers to classical sources profusely.

Worldview and Language Teaching

The most striking fact about language-teaching in the *madrassas* is that it is, to use a phrase from A.H. Nayyar, `frozen in time' (Nayyar 1998). The Arabic books are often those which were used in the medieval age and were prescribed later by Mullah Nizamuddin Sehalvi in the middle of the 18th century. (Those marked by aesterisks below were part of the original *Dars-e-Nizami*).

The core textbooks of Arabic grammar -- *sarf* and *nahw* -- are shared by all the sects. The following, for instance, are used by *madrassas* of most sects at some level:

Sarf	**Nahw**	**Literature**
**Sarf-e-Meer*	*Nahw-e-Meer*	*Muqamat-e-Hurairi*
Ilm-ul-Seegha	*Sharah Ibn-e-Aqil*	
**Fasul-e-Akbari*	**Kafia*	
**Munshaib*	**Sharh Jami*	
	**Sharah-i-Miat Amil*	

Table 4: Language Teaching in Madrassas – Facts about Schools & Students.

Province/ Area	Number of Madrassas (Number in 1995 & 1997 is given in brackets but is not used for calculating percentages etc) (1995)	1988	Number of Students in 1988	Schools teaching Persian	Schools teaching English and level of teaching		Number of students learning English	Schools giving more marks for taking examination in Arabic
Punjab	(1886)	1320	206,778	779	Middle Matric Above	101 78 36	6,951	510
N.W.F.P FATA	(686) (184)	678	87,707	513	Middle Matric Above	10 13 8	2,608	396
Sind	(499)	291	71,239	262	Middle Matric Above	10 15 8	2,529	163`
Baluchistan	(403)	347	40,390	260	Middle Matric Above	14 7 6	1,139	239
Azad Kashmir	(83)	76	43,787	22	Middle Above	7 6	91	17

Continued…

Province/ Area	Number of Madrassas (Number in 1995 & 1997 is given in brackets but is not used for calculating percentages etc) (1995)	1988	Number of Students in 1988	Schools teaching Persian	Schools teaching English and level of teaching		Number of students learning English	Schools giving more marks for taking examination in Arabic
Islamabad	(58)	76	8,258	46	Middle Matric Above	6 4 1	110	11
Northern Areas	(107)	103	12,150	36	Middle Matric	4 1	102	25
Numbers	(3,906)	2,891	470,309	1,918		335	13,530	1,361
Percentage				66.34%*		11.58%*	2.87%+	47.07*

Note: * The percentages of schools teaching different languages are based on the 1988 total of 2,891 schools given in chart-1.

\+ The percentages of students are also based on the figure of 470,309 for 1988 which has changed to 540,048 in 1995 but the percentage probably still remains valid.

Most of these books were used even earlier than the *Dars-e-Nizami* and they were also prescribed in it. What is striking is that the *madrassas* of Pakistan today still teach many of the *Dars-e-Nizami* texts on Arabic. The oldest books are in Arabic, then come books in Arabic with explanation in Persian and the most modern texts explicate in Urdu. Urdu was used to teach Arabic at the Calcutta *Madrassa* whereas ordinarily, in the *Dars-e-Nizami*, Persian was used for this purpose (Shahabi n.d: 187).

The Arabic books are treatises on grammar in rhymed couplets. One of the best known among them, *Kafia Ibn-e-Malik*, is so obscure that it is always taught through a commentary called the *Sharah Ibn-e-Aqil*. The commentary is often the dread of students and a source of pride for the teacher who has mastered it. The *kafia* features in the courses of many well known religious leaders in India – such as Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi, the founder of the Darul Uloom at Deoband, the leading *madrassah* of India (Rizvi 1980: 77). *Mizan*, being easier, was read earlier and the report of 1866 A.D proclaims proudly that `the students who had entered the *madrassah* reading the *Mizan* now read the *kafia*' (Rizvi 1980: 121). In the *madrassas* Arabic is not taught as a living language. The student is made to memorise the rhymed couplets from the ancient texts as well as their explanations. As the explanations in a number of texts are in Persian, which is also memorized, the student generally fails to apply his knowledge to the living language. Some ancient texts, such as the *Mizbah-ul-Nahw*, are explained in Urdu. But in this case the Urdu is very Arabicized. The explanation is scholastic and would not be understood, let alone convince, somebody who is not familiar with (and convinced by) the special branch of medieval Islamic philosophy on which it is based.

Grammar is divided in *nahw* and *sarf*. *Nahw* is generally translated as syntax. But the beginning of this branch of learning was concern for religious correctness. According to Abdur Rahman a man mispronounced Rasulullah as Rasulillah and the Caliph Umar ordered Abu Al Sood Du'ali to collect the rules of correct pronunciation -- *nahw* (Ahmad n.d). In short, *nahw* referred to pronunciation or, to be more exact, the mispronunciation of segments which could bring unacceptable changes in the meaning. This would be something which modern linguists call morphophonemics -- rules about the pronunciation of units of meaning. However, in time pronunciation has become the concern of *qira'at* -- the art of reciting the Quran -- while books of *nahw* deal with word-order i.e with roughly what may be called syntax.

Sarf is translated as morphology -- the study of the formation of words. But this is not to be understood as the kind of morphology taught by modern linguists trained in the West. Both *sarf* and *nahw* are prescriptive and their underlying aim is not the investigation of language to see how it functions but to preserve it against change. The standard of correctness is, of course, classical Arabic and the idea of teaching grammatical texts is to create a defensive mechanism which would prevent any deviation from the linguistic rules found therein.

The following chart gives a general idea of the languages taught in the *madrassas*:

Table 5: Sect-wise Information on Language-Teaching in Madrassas

Sect	Year of study	Languages Taught	Comments on texts
Deobandi	16	Urdu, Arabic, Persian	Upto 8th class government textbooks are used. After that, traditional Arabic and Persian ones are taught. Only Arabic is taught after 8th.
Barelvi	8	Arabic, Persian	Except in the Persian course for the first year, traditional Arabic textbooks are used till the 6th year.
Ahl-e-Hadith	6	Arabic, Optional English from level 9th to 12th	Traditional textbooks begin in the first year (equivalent to class 9) and M.A. Arabic textbooks are used for composition (*Insha*) in the last two years.
Shia		Arabic, Persian	The beginning year (equivalent of class 6) as well as classes 7&8 have government textbooks of Persian and Arabic. Above that level traditional Arabic texts are taught with more emphasis on Arabic literature than in the other schools.

The emphasis on English was meant to introduce the *ulema* to the modern world. The function of modern Arabic literature was also the same. Moreover, both Urdu and English would be taught through the texts prepared by the official Textbook Boards. They would have lessons on nationalism and one of their aims would be to create a modern citizen and a Pakistani nationalist. Moreover, if the *ulema* learnt to read English, arguably some of them would encounter alien philosophies such as socialism, human rights, feminism and liberal democracy on their own rather than through the polemical refutations of these philosophies taught to them in their final year. In short, as the *ulema* realised, changes in language-teaching threatened their worldview. Not surprisingly, then, they opposed them strongly and the reforms `were translated into action in a limited way' (Report 1962 in Malik 1996: 128) -- so `limited' indeed that the average *madrassa* student still has a medieval perception of the world: that it is divided into believers and non-believers and that the latter are enemies.

The first regime which tried to integrate the *madrassas* was the military regime of Ayub Khan (1958-1969). As we have seen, the regime was modernist, authoritarian and centrist (i.e it wanted a strong centre). Ayub Khan's Commission on National Education emphasized Urdu and English. At the secondary level, indeed, English was recommended as the alternative medium of instruction (the other being Arabic). The relevant changes proposed by the Commission are as follows:

Table 6:

Ibteddayah	Thanawi Tahtoni	Thanawi Wastani	Thanawi Fawqani	Al'la
5 years	3 years	2 years	2 years	3 years
1-5 class	6-8 class	9-10 class	11-12 class	13-15 class
Language texts used in government schools	Modern Arabic Literature, English, Urdu	English (Urdu as optional).	Modern Arabic Literature, English.	English as an additional subject

Source: Report 1962 in Malik 1996 : Table II, p. 127

The common perception of educated people in Pakistan is that Ayub Khan tried to integrate the *madrassa*, as it were, from the outside while Zia ul Haq (1977-1988), the champion of Islamization in Pakistan, tried the same from the inside. Among other things Zia ul Haq used the mosques to spread literacy. In 1984-85 the Iqra Centres were launched by the Literacy and Mass Education Campaign (LAMEC). These centres, established in mosques and *madrassas*, were required to teach Urdu. The teacher or his delegate was supposed to be an *alim*. He `would have to know Islamic injunctions and act accordingly' (Malik 1996: 274) -- which, of course, was superfluous for an *alim* but ensured that his delegate could only be an orthodox, practising Muslim.

But Zia ul Haq was not an insider of the *madrassa* system. However Islamic in his views, he was a product of the colonial sector. Thus, his aims were modern : the spread of literacy; nation-building; integration; using Islam as a symbol of unity; creation of an educated national work force and so on. That is why Jamal Malik's thesis that all governments, including that of Zia ul Haq, try to colonialize Islam seems credible. This `colonialization' changes the worldview of the *ulema*. It grafts new ideas, such as that of nationalism on traditional beliefs. The state believes that nothing should remain outside the ambit of its overriding ideology, nationalism, and incorporating it with Islam is a way of making it palatable for the *madrassas*.

One thing, however, which Malik has not mentioned in this context is that in this process the medieval institution transforms the colonial sector too. The Pakistani state's emphasis on Islamic texts in state-controlled schools, for instance, has made vernacular-educated urban Pakistanis more receptive to the ideas of the *madrassas* than before. So, spreading literacy through the *ulema* (or people like them), would arguably make people more open to orthodox opinions than before. The employment of the *ulema* as teachers of Arabic (especially in the NWFP and Balochistan) when it was made compulsory in 1982, again by Zia ul Haq, also meant that more students in state schools came in contact with orthodox views. This means that the effort to bring the *madrassa* in the mainstream, the process of `colonialization' or integration, has brought about less change in the worldview of the products of the *madrassas* than in that of the non-Westernized part of Pakistani urban society. That is perhaps why so many Pakistanis are now prone to seeing the `other' in religious terms leading to attacks on other sects, minorities and people dubbed as blasphemers or heretics.

Change from Within

Not all of the *ulema* condemn all change. Many feel that changes in language-teaching should be encouraged. Among these changes is the proposed reform in the teaching of Arabic. Maulana Abdul Majid Nadwi, a writer and compiler of Arabic texts, writes as follows:

> *This is a very surprising and incomprehensible thing that some individual or group should spend a large part of their lives and their mental capabilities in studying*

> *compositions written in the Arabic language but still remain entirely incapable of expressing themselves in it. This experiment in languages is only the characteristic of the Arabic madrassas and learned councils of India (Nadwi 1953: 9).*

In Pakistan, the Insititute of Policy Studies, an organization of the Jama'at-i-Islami, too emphasizes change. Some people subjected the old Arabic texts to criticism on the grounds that they were very abstruse and old fashioned. Syed Mohammad Nazim Nadwi pointed out that when Nadwa was established some people wanted to prescribe books as outdated and obscure as *Muslim ul uloom* (Nadwi, N 1987: 183). Such texts, the reformers pointed out, encouraged memorization. But a substantial number of the *ulema* wanted just that. They opposed reform on the grounds that there would be a dilution of the Islamic canon and that, in the name of reform, the modern world would steal in (IPS 1987). In any case the Jama'at is a revivalist (Nasr 1996), not an orthodox, party which accepted Ayub Khan's proposals about changes in the curricula of the *madrassas* in 1959 (Malik 1996) despite opposition to his government otherwise.

However, despite the resistance to reform among the orthodox *ulema,* some aspects of the modern worldview have crept in through the modern texts. In the Deobandi schools, Urdu is taught through the government textbooks till the equivalent of class 8th. This means that the messages of Pakistani nationalism, glorification of war and the military and some cognizance of the modern world becomes part of the students' worldview. In the equivalent of class-12 the *Muallim ul Insha*, written by an Indian *alim,* is used. This book, by its very emphases and choice of topics, reveals itself to be a response, however reactionary, to modernity. Being a response it is in dialogue with modernity and does not live in a world which simply ignores it. For instance, whereas the ancient books never felt it necessary to prescribe an Islamic form of behaviour as it was not in dispute or under threat, this one does. Typical sentences from *Muallim ul Insha* are as follows:

1. These girls have been ordered to put on the veil and they have been stopped from going to the *bazaar*.
2. You women are really ungrateful to your husbands (Nadwi 1953 : 1) (My translation from Urdu).
3. There is also some emphasis on militarism, also missing in the medieval texts. The choice of sentences was, according to the author, meant for those who would later be `soldiers of Islam' (Nadwi 1953: 11). Some sentences promote glorification of conquest while others are anti-British:
4. Tariq Bin Ziyad conquered Andalusia.
5. The English were always the enemies of Islam (My translation from Urdu).

Egypt is often presented as a corrupt, licentious country where men and women meet freely and wine is imbibed (Nadwi 1954, Vol. 2 : 126). This is in keeping with the *madrassas* having taken up a more active role after the 1950s than before in the Islamic revivalist movement. Upto the middle of the twentieth century, as mentioned earlier, the *madrassas* were mostly concerned with the preservation of the past. Having a beseiged mentality they buried themselves in the past and shunned change as the source of the greatest danger. After that, especially because of the rise of revivalist Islamic movements in Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and elsewhere, the *madrassas* have started incorporating some aspects of revivalism -- strict adherence to the *shari'ah* and militancy -- in their curricula.

It is because of this that some compilers, such as Abdul Majid Nadwi, go so far as to suggest that the *Muqamat-e-Hariri,* a prose work which has, for centuries, been and still is part of curricula for Arabic prose is no longer relevant for the present-day *alim*. Criticizing the traditional *alim* Nadwi says that he would consider it easier to express himself in poetry than in prose though this is unnatural (Nadwi 1954,

Vol. 2 : 16). That is why his own text book contains essays on Qutub Minar, Deoband, Nadwa and so on (Nadwi 1955).

In the IPS seminar a number of *ulema* pointed out that the *madrassas* emphasize sectarianism -- a point brought out in detail by A.H. Nayyar -- and that, among other things, they should promote `the ideology of Pakistan' in addition to theological learning (Hashmi 1987). But the *ulema* have generally resisted the state's attempts to turn them into `instruments of nationalism' (Malik 1996: 175) as we have seen. Thus, even at this seminar some of the *ulema* even opposed the teaching of English until the students had completed their studies (Kakakhel 1987: 211) and most of them did not agree with any major change in their teaching.

The Teaching of Persian

Persian lingers on in the *madrassas* mainly because they are conservative. It is no longer the language of learning and the secular system of education has discarded it but the *madrassas* still teach it, though at a much reduced level, because they are resistant to change. Actually, Persian was often a source of embarrassment for some of the more puritanical *ulema* after the reformist zeal of Shah Waliullah and his disciples in India. During the heyday of Persian, the *madrassas* also taught Persian literature. In 1551 Abdul Haqq of Dehli studied the *Bostan*, *Gulistan* of Sa'adi as well as the *Dewan* of Hafiz before learning the Arabic texts from his father Sheikh Saif Uddin (Sufi 1941: 56-57; also see Nadwi 1936: 118-123 for the Persian curricula of the *madrassas* of India).

The Persian schools, of course, taught much more Persian literature. But even if the *madrassas* did not, the *Gulistan* and *Bostan* had chapters on love, especially on love of boys. Poetry was, indeed, suspected by the *ulema* and there is a religious decree of a Deoband *alim* who blames poets for having `fanned the flames' of unnatural lust (Zafeer Uddin, 1965: 37). Drinking wine, asking for kisses, desiring the beloved -- however much they might by metaphors for the mystic desire for union with an immanent deity -- could not but focus the minds of the students on the aesthetic and erotic aspects of life. That is why the *ulema* were ambivalent towards Persian literature.

The books which they did approve of, and which remain necessary texts even now, were Attar's *Pand Nama*, *Nam-e-Haq* and Sa'adi's *Karima*. These books are didactic and they are in Persian rhymed couplets. Although they are `safe' from the *ulema's* point of view, being about morality, this morality is strictly medieval and patriarchal. Both *Pand Nama* and *Karima* approve of hospitality and condemn miserliness. In both silence is a virtue and spontaneous talking is not. In both women are inferior, untrustworthy and alluring as, indeed, are beardless boys. Both belong to a male world confident in its superiority. Women are faithless and the wise must suspect them. As *Pand Nama* has it:

> *Awal az zan aashtan chashm-e-wafa*
> *Soda dil ra bas khata bashad khata*
> (At first men hope for faith from women. Understand that giving one's heart to women is a mistake; a great mistake).

and *Karima*, *Gulistan* and *Bostan*, the basic texts which are taught in *madrassas*, reinforce this attitude.

Nam-e-Haq is different, being about cleanliness, ablutions, prayers and other rituals. In a way all these books complement one another. The reality of the worldview in the other books is supported by the rituals

which are part of the faith. That is probably why the *ulema* feel that any idea challenging their patriarchal worldview is a danger to the faith itself.

According to teachers of *madrassas*, the parts of the *Gulistan* and *Bostan* dealing with love are not taught nowadays.[6] Chapter-5 of the Gulistan, which contains love stories, is not part of the curricula at all. The other books too are taught through rote learning. In the end, the products of *madrassas* can neither write nor speak modern Persian. In the Shia *madrassas* too, although the textbooks of Persian are those prescribed for classes 6 and 7 in government schools, there is no special emphasis on the language. Indeed, the traditional Persian texts are not prescribed as they are in the Sunni *madrassas*. In short, the teaching of Persian is meant to keep a symbolic link of continuity with tradition. That is why only the traditional texts, the ones which were used in medieval India, are used in most *madrassas* while modern Persian literature is ignored. Persian, like all the other languages, is meant to reinforce the *ulemas'* worldview not to disrupt it.

Other Pakistani Languages

As mentioned earlier, the *madrassas* use Pashto, and in some parts of Sindh, Sindhi, as media of instruction. They also use other Pakistani languages which the state never uses in its own institutions. Among these languages are Punjabi, Siraiki and Hindko. At the basic level teachers use the local language because pupils understand no other. This, however, is not peculiar to *madrassas* since teachers in state schools also use local languages to explain points. What is different from the state institutions is that some *madrassas* report teaching Punjabi as an additional language. In south Punjab, in the Siraiki area, some respondents (*Madrassa ulema*) took pride in Siraiki saying that it was their identity[7].

In Sind the Deoband *ulema* seem to have supported Sindhi nationalism (Malik 1996: 216). The Barelvis, who also teach English, are also accommodating towards the other languages. At the intermediate level they offer Sindhi, Kashmiri, Siraiki, Punjabi, Balochi and Pashto. However, the books for these languages come from the state (Ibid 173). Are we then to conclude that, while the *ulema* resist Pakistani or state-imposed nationalism, they support ethnic nationalism? This, however, would not be true even for the Deobandis who are reported to have supported Sindhi nationalism. What is plausible is that the *ulema*, in reaction to the Westernized state, support what the common people find congenial -- their own languages. The *ulema* are from the poor classes, the classes which speak local languages most of the time, and their sympathy with these languages is a carryover of their class attitudes. It is unlikely that the *ulema* support ethnic nationalism any more than state nationalism. Their apparent support of Sindhi nationalism could be seen as a populist reaction to the alienation of the common people from the state everywhere but especially in Sindh.

Language-teaching in the Pakistani *madrassas* is part of indoctrination. It complements other doctrinaire subjects supporting, reproducing and reinforcing their philosophical import. This worldview sees social reality in terms of faith. The `other', then, is the non-Muslim, the heretic, the blasphemer and even the follower of another sect or a Westernized non-practising Muslim.

During British rule the `other' was ignored or excommunicated. Since the creation of Pakistan the *ulema* have tried to empower themselves at the expense of the `other'. In recent years, especially since the Islamic revolution in Iran and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, this process of self-empowerment

6. Interview of Persian teachers of *madrassas* during the above survey.
7. Remarks of 3 respondents (out of 10) to the question : `Do you teach any of the local languages in your institution?' in the above survey in Southern Punjab.

has become militant or, at the very least, much more aggressive and self-confident than before. The teaching of new languages could put dents, as it were, in the orthodox armoury of the *madrassas*. That is why it is resisted and the *madrassas* continue to uphold their traditional ways in the teaching of languages.

Conclusion

It has emerged in this study that students in Pakistani schools are exposed to different worldviews through language-teaching and social studies textbooks. The students of all state controlled, or state-influenced, schools are exposed to texts which tend to create, or reinforce, Pakistan nationalism and support for war and the military. As both themes are often presented in the religious idiom the state and its policies tend to be sacralized and are often equated with Islam itself. While all students in English and Urdu-medium schools are exposed to this state-sponsored worldview, the English school children have other, secularising influences upon them. These come from informal exposure to films, foreign sources of information, and people with a liberal, western worldview. What is relevant for us, however, is that this western worldview also comes from English textbooks written in the West. This western worldview is based upon individualism and legitimizes the quest for freedom and the necessity of human rights. In many ways this worldview alienates people from indigenous values. For instance, it values individualism whereas Pakistani society values the social group – the family, the sub-class (*biradri*) and the class. However, since it values freedom and human rights, it tends to create theoretical grounds for the empowerment of women and for upholding the freedom of opinion, the press and, in the final analysis, liberal democracy itself. Thus, whereas the products of English-medium schools are likely to be alienated from the indigenous Pakistani culture and may, indeed, look down upon most Pakistanis, they are also likely to support democracy and human rights.

The *madrassas* are least exposed to the ideology of the state. They are taught languages which give them privileged access to religious texts. Thus, their way of looking at the world is different from both the Urdu and the English school children. For them the state is an alien power. Moreover, the 'other' is defined in religious terms. Truth, then, inheres in one's own sect while the 'other' deviates from it. In recent years the *madrassas* have gained confidence because of the success of the Iranian revolution and the Talibans in Afghanistan. They have now become militant and may feel that their worldview, in which religion is the most significant boundary and identity marker, can be imposed by force.

The other aspect of language-teaching which has not been the focus of this study is that language give access to domains of power. English is used in the highest domains of power both within Pakistan and abroad. Urdu is used in the lower domains of power in Pakistan. Arabic is used in the unregulated domain of religious power in Pakistan. Thus, English school products have privileged access to the best jobs in Pakistan and abroad; Urdu school ones to middle and lower-middle class jobs and *madrassa* products to religious jobs in mosques and *madrassa* networks which are also lower middle class and lower class in status. Language, then, also corresponds to class and the language one learns opens doors to a certain class.

In short language-teaching policies in Pakistan reinforce class divisions and cultural divisions within the country. Further, they reinforce or create different worldviews which are not only alienated from each other but are suspicious of, and even hostile, to each other. Language-teaching in Pakistan, then, reinforces differences and disrupts society. It has strengthened the kind of ideological divide which has the potential to destroy the social fabric in the time to come. Whether the threat will come from the class

division or the ideological one cannot be predicted. However, if one were to venture a guess, it seems that the class conflict will take on the form of an ideological one. Possibly the *madrassa* products will join hands with the more Islamized Urdu school products to wrest away power from the English and other Urdu school products if the state is further discredited; if insecurity increases further and poverty increases. If this is to be avoided justice should be provided for all. Justice in language-teaching is related with empowerment which comes from providing equal access to job. This means that the state should teach all children through the language in which the domains of power, both private and governmental, function. This language should no longer be English at any level. It should either be Urdu or Urdu and some other indigenous language(s) of Pakistan. This will ensure that the injustice of giving privileged access to the best jobs in Pakistan to the English-educated elite comes to an end. However, since this increased importance of Urdu may expose more people to non-liberal values, there is also need of all texts being made to incorporate liberal values. There is also need to teach English to all students so that their chances of exposure to the liberal worldview are not eliminated. Both English-medium elitist schools and *madrassas* will oppose the changes suggested here. However, if English is no longer the language of Pakistani institutions, most English schools will stop using it as a medium of instruction. Those which are state-influenced can, of course, be forced to follow the new policy. Possibly some English-medium schools with their eye on the international market will remain but they will be the exception. The *madrassas*, however, will resist the forced teaching of Urdu and English. This resistance need not be countered by force. Instead, if the state provides universal education and facilities in state schools, poor people will send their children to state schools rather than *madrassas*. IN any case, the number of people trained in the new uniform kind of schools will be so large that the more extreme opinion from the *madrassas* will be marginalized. Language-teaching, then, is not merely an issue of making people learn to speak, read and write languages. It is a political activity because it connects with access to power on the one hand and worldview with the other. If Pakistan is to become a democracy and a welfare state in any sense of those terms, it should address itself to the question of language-teaching without loss of time.

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Annex A

Language-wise Average Ideological Content in Textbooks
Expressed in Percentages of the Total number of lessons

	Urdu	English	Sindhi	Pashto	Arabic	Persian
Class 1	22	Zero – or not taught(NT)	19	22	Not taught (NT)	Not taught (NT)
Class 2	31	2 / NT	36	44	NT	NT
Class 3	38	5 / NT	36	44	NT	NT
Class 4	47	7 / NT	33	66	NT	NT
Class 5	47	Nil	26	37	NT	NT
Class 6	49	4	34	46	NT	15
Class 7	59	7	36	50	70	47
Class 8	50	15	26	36	81	38
Class 9	30	28	21	NT	50	28
Class 10	30	7	21	NT	80	28
Percentage of Average Content (Ideological)	**40**	**8**	**29**	**43**	**71**	**31**

Note: English is taught at the discretion of the headmaster in urban schools. It is not taught in rural schools in Islamabad and Punjab.
Persian is compulsory in B'Tan (6-10th) NWFP it is compulsory (6-8th).

SDPI is an independent non-profit research Institute
on Sustainable development

Mailing Address: PO Box 2342, Islamabad Pakistan

Street Address: 3rd Floor, Taimoor Chamber, 10-D West,
Fazal-ul-Haq Road, Blue Area, Islamabad.

Telephone: +(92-51) 2277146
2278134 2278136 2270674-6

Fax: +(92-51) 2278135

URL: www.sdpi.org e-mail: main@sdpi.org